The basis of the carrier’s liability and the burden of proof in cargo claims arising under  contracts for the carriage of goods by sea evidenced by bills of lading. by Chetty, Nivani.
THE BASIS OF THE CARRIER’S LIABILITY AND THE
BURDEN OF PROOF IN CARGO CLAIMS ARISING UNDER
CONTRACTS FOR THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA
EVIDENCED BY BILLS OF LADING
NIVANI CHETTY
211532491
Mini Dissertation submitted in 2018 to the School of Law in fulfilment of the
requirements of the degree of Master of Laws in Maritime Law
College of Law and Management Studies
School of Law
Unit of Maritime Law and Maritime Studies
Supervisor: Mrs Dusty-Lee Donnelly
ii
DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY
DECLARATION
I, Nivani Chetty, declare that:
(i) The research reported in this dissertation, except where otherwise indicated,
is my original work.
(ii) This dissertation has not been submitted for any degree or examination at any
other university.
(iii) This dissertation does not contain other persons’ data, pictures, graphs or
other information, unless specifically acknowledged as being sourced from
other persons.
(iv) This dissertation does not contain other persons’ writing, unless specifically
acknowledged as being sourced from other researchers. Where other written
sources have been quoted, then:
(a) their words have been re-written but the general information attributed to
them has been referenced;
(b) where their exact words have been used, their writing has been placed
inside  quotation marks, and referenced.
(v) Where I have reproduced a publication of which I am author, co-author or
editor, I have indicated in detail which part of the publication was actually
written by myself alone and have fully referenced such publications.
(vi) This dissertation does not contain text, graphics or tables copied and pasted
from the Internet, unless specifically acknowledged, and the source being
detailed in the dissertation and in the References sections.
__________________
Nivani Chetty
Date: ____/____/_______
iii
DEDICATION
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Cliffy and Tweedy, who are my greatest
blessings in life.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Firstly, I would like to Thank God for being an unconditional light in my life and for
giving me the strength and courage to overcome all obstacles.
I would like to acknowledge my late granddad, Nat. I was blessed with the most
wonderful granddad who was an inspiration to me, who encouraged me to always
reach for the stars and turn my dreams into reality.
I would like to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to my parents, Cliffy and
Tweedy, for their unconditional love, guidance, and encouragement throughout my
life. Thank you for always having faith in me and in my ability to succeed. Thank you
for the numerous sacrifices that you have made to ensure that I live my best life. This
dissertation would not have been possible without your unwavering support.
I am deeply indebted to my brother Nivesh, for being a pillar of strength to me during
my period of study, and to my sister Simone for her constant support.
I would like to thank my astute supervisor, Mrs Dusty-Lee Donnelly, for her dedication,
patience, support and guidance. Thank you for so willingly providing me with extensive
personal and professional guidance. I appreciate your expert advice and efforts in
facilitating my dissertation.
I would like to thank my friends and family for their endless love and support.
vABSTRACT
The burden of proof in maritime law has proven to be an issue in some of the cases
that pertain to cargo claims. It is therefore important to analyse and compare the basis
of liability and the burden of proof in the various international maritime regimes, being
the Hague/Hague-Visby rules, the Hamburg rules and the Rotterdam rules.
The Hague/Hague-Visby rules were formed in order to aid in the operations of
international maritime trade and to create a balance in the risks between the carrier
and the cargo owner. The Hamburg rules were then drafted as its drafters were of the
view that the Hague/Hague-Visby rules had failed to create a balance between the
carrier and cargo owner’s interests. It was hoped that this regime would lead to
uniformity within maritime trade, however, the regime has not been widely adopted.
The Hamburg rules is said to have further frustrated the laws relating to maritime trade,
however it did change the fault based system from proved fault to presumed fault. This
change in the system of fault requires an analysis to determine whether or not it
impacts the outcome of the cases.
The latest regime that was drafted with the object of reaching uniformity and creating
a modernised multimodal regime which no other regime has ever done, is the
Rotterdam rules. The Hague/Hague-Visby rules are therefore regarded as outdated
as they do not take the modern technologies into consideration. The proponents of the
Rotterdam rules take the view that this regime will in fact reach its objective whilst the
detractors believe that it will only fragment the laws of maritime trade further. The
incidence of the burden of proof and the basis of the carrier's liability is an important
question and given the impact on cargo claimants (who may be South African shippers
or consignees) it is a consideration that may assist in determining whether it would be
in the interests of South Africa to retain the Hague/Hague-Visby rules or consider
ratifying either the Hamburg rules or the Rotterdam rules.
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1CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Brief overview of topic
‘Like under the common law, the burden of proof under the Hague and Hague-Visby
rules shifts more frequently than the winds on a stormy sea’.1
The burden of proof is of particular importance in establishing which party to the cargo
claim will bear the onus of discharging the proof throughout the case. The general rule
applied is that ‘[h]e who alleges must prove’, however, it will have to be determined
whether the Hague/Hague-Visby rules are in line with this maxim. A contrast of the
traditional approach to the burden of proof advocated by professor Tetley, and the
case law which supported his approach, and the recent case law is significant in
establishing the current approach to the application of the burden of proof in maritime
trade. The order of proof which Tetley refers to as being the ‘ping pong’2 conduct of a
claim between the claimant and carrier will also be discussed.
The Hague/Hague-Visby rules follow a proved fault system which will be contrasted
with the presumed fault system followed under the Hamburg rules, in order to
determine whether the Hamburg rules have in fact increased the carrier’s liability in
the carriage of goods by sea. Previously, under the common law, there was strict
liability placed on carriers even if they were not responsible for damage to the cargo
in terms of negligence. However, in the 19th century, carriers that had a superior
bargaining power managed to find a way around this ‘strict liability’.3 The carriers found
a way to introduce more ‘exception’ clauses into the bill of lading. The carriers would
abuse their power as they were allowed to contract out of liability under the common
law,4 and eventually the carriers were exempted from liability for almost all causes of
damage to cargo as well as for their negligence. The carriers would even go so far as
to include a clause in the contract of carriage which provided for an exclusion of liability
in its entirety.5
1 Banana Services Inc v MV Fleetwave 911 F2d 519 521 (11th Cir 1990).
2 W Tetley ‘The Burden And Order Of Proof In Marine Cargo Claims’ at 31, available at https://www.arbitrage-
maritime.org/fr/Gazette/G37complement/burden.pdf, accessed on 10 April 2018.
3 T Nikaki; B Soyer ‘New International Regime for Carriage of Goods by Sea: Contemporary, Certain, Inclusive
and Efficient, or Just Another One for the Shelves?’ (2012) 30 Berkeley J. Int'l L. at 303.
4 T Nikaki; B Soyer op cit note 3 at 303.
5 Ibid.
2A desperate need then arose to balance the risks of the carrier and cargo owner as
well as to facilitate international trade.6 In an attempt to address this issue the Harter
Act was passed in the year 1893.7 The Act provided that the carrier may escape liability
using the exception of navigation or management of the ship where he satisfies certain
conditions. However, the Act went on to disregard any provisions relating to the bill of
lading whereby the carrier would be exempted from making the ship seaworthy or in
the care of cargo.8 The navigation and management exception was known as the
Harter Act’s ‘compromise’ and continued to remain in the latter regimes, being the
Hague Rules and thereafter the Hague-Visby rules. This exception is known as
possibly the most ‘contentious’ exception in maritime trade.9 The Hague/Hague-Visby
rules are outdated in that sense as they include this defence even though modern
technology defeats the purpose of the defence.10 It can be argued that the reason for
keeping this defence is that it serves as a balancing act between the carrier and cargo
owner.11 However, other maritime regimes such as the Hamburg rules and the
Rotterdam rules have abolished this defence and take the view that it is detrimental to
cargo owners and more in favour of carriers.
In dealing with the carrier’s liability, the burden of proof is of great significance as it
plays a major role in determining the outcome of certain cases. Establishing when the
carrier or claimant will be expected to discharge the burden of proof becomes an issue
in such cases where there is uncertainty as to the cause of the damage or loss and
where the parties put forward conflicting evidence. In cases where the damage or loss
occurs at sea, it is difficult for the claimant to establish how the damage or loss had
taken place since the claimant would not have been present at the time of the
incident.12 It was said that the burden of proof in the case of negligence is a highly
6 T Nikaki; B Soyer op cit note 3 at 303.
7 R Hellawell ‘Allocation of Risk between Cargo Owner and Carrier’ (1979) 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 357.
8 Ibid at 358.
9 J Hare Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 2 ed (2009) 799. Also see S R Mandelbaum,
‘Creating uniform worldwide liability standards for sea carriage of goods under the Hague, COGSA, Visby and
Hamburg conventions’ (1996) 23 Transp. L.J. 471 at 487.
10 F Reynolds ‘The Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules, and the Hamburg Rules’ (1990) 7 Australian and New
Zealand Maritime Law Journal at 28.
11 S R Mandelbaum, ‘Creating uniform worldwide liability standards for sea carriage of goods under the Hague,
COGSA, Visby and Hamburg conventions’ (1996) 23 Transp. L.J. 471 at 488.
12 R Force ‘A Comparison of the Hague, Hague Visby, and Hamburg rules: Much ado about (?)’ (1995-1996) 70
Tulane Law Review at 2085, Also see D K Schollenberger, ‘Risk of Loss in Shipping under the Hamburg Rules’
(1981) 10 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y at 568 and F Reynolds op cit note 10 at 29.
3controversial issue13 and as a result, the question arises as to whether a carrier will
have to first disprove negligence before relying on an excepted peril.
1.2 Rationale and Purpose of the study
The purpose of this study is to analyse the burden of proof and to compare and
contrast the manner in which the basis of liability and the burden of proof is set out
and to be applied in the various international maritime regimes, namely; the
Hague/Hague-Visby rules, the Hamburg rules and the Rotterdam rules. The writer will
attempt to do this by examining how each regime makes provision for the interests of
the carrier and the cargo owner. The defences relied on most frequently by the carrier
will be discussed under both the Hague/Hague-Visby rules and the Rotterdam rules.
The Hamburg rules do not provide a list of exceptions which the carrier may rely on
and instead provides for liability solely under the basis of liability article. This will also
be analysed and discussed in order to compare the regimes. This topic is of particular
importance due to the fact that South Africa applies the Hague/Hague-Visby rules by
virtue of the Carriage of Goods by sea Act 1 of 1986 (‘COGSA’) and therefore whether
or not this regime should be retained is a pertinent question.
1.3 Research Objectives
Research question 1:
How do each of the international maritime regimes make provision for and deal with
the basis of the carrier’s liability in the carriage of goods by sea?
Research question 2:
How do each of the international maritime regimes make provision for and deal with
the burden of proof?
Research question 3:
How do the operation of the major international maritime regimes compare and
contrast?
13 The Torenia [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep 210 at 218.
41.4 Breakdown of chapters
Chapter one entails a brief overview of the topic, the purpose of this study and goes
further to set out the research questions as well as a breakdown of the chapters.
Chapter two examines the key provisions under the Hague/Hague-Visby rules, and in
particular, the provisions dealing with the burden of proof in cargo claims. The chapter
deals with the carrier’s obligation to exercise due diligence in making the vessel
seaworthy and covers the period of responsibility of the carrier. The chapter goes
further and focuses on the defences frequently relied on by carriers to escape liability.
Chapter three entails an overview of the concept of proof applied in the South African
law of evidence. The chapter deals with issues that have surrounded the burden of
proof in cargo claims. A detailed analysis on the burden of proof under the
Hague/Hague-Visby rules is set out and case law is used to illustrate the approach
that has been adopted.
Chapter four will examine whether or not the Hamburg rules have changed the
carrier’s duties and if so, the extent to which the carrier’s duties have increased. The
chapter will set out the burden of proof under the Hamburg rules and compare the
application of the burden of proof under the Hague/Hague-Visby rules and the
Hamburg rules by doing a case analysis on how the Hamburg rules would be used to
decide matters which have already been decided by the courts that have applied the
Hague/Hague-Visby rules.
Chapter five will examine the Rotterdam rules and the burden of proof will be set out
and analysed in detail to illustrate the shifting of the burden of proof and counter proof
under this regime. The chapter will also discuss some of the defences under the
Rotterdam rules, including an in-depth discussion of the abolition of the nautical fault
rule.
Chapter six concludes the dissertation. It provides a summary of the findings and the
writer’s recommendations.
51.5 Methodology
The methodology adopted for this dissertation was desktop research. The writer has
surveyed textbooks and journal articles as well as referred to the texts of the relevant
conventions and case law. The writer has done a thorough search of reported and
unreported South African case law dealing with cargo claims but has also, because
there is lack of reported South African authorities, considered foreign case law from
the United Kingdom, Australia and America, focusing on decisions that have been
analysed in the journal articles and in textbooks under the discussion of the burden of
proof. Several of the authors adopted a comparative methodology where they used a
case decided under the Hague/Hague-Visby rules to illustrate how the Hamburg or
Rotterdam rules might have applied differently and I will adopt the same approach in
those chapters as a means of illustrating how the burden of proof changes under the
three regimes.
6CHAPTER TWO: THE HAGUE AND HAGUE-VISBY RULES
2.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with the key provisions in the Hague and Hague-Visby rules1, that
being articles 3 and 4 of the rules. The provisions dealt with in this chapter, pertain
specifically to the burden of proof in cargo claims arising in respect of the carriage of
goods by sea. It covers the period of responsibility of the carrier, the carrier’s due
diligence in making the ship seaworthy under article 3 rule 1, as well as the duty to
properly care for the cargo under article 3 rule 2. The chapter focuses on certain of the
carrier’s exemptions from liability under article 4 rule 2, namely; the nautical fault
exception, the fire exception, the perils of the sea defence and inherent vice. The
chapter focuses on these defences in particular as they are relied in cargo claims and
the nautical fault exception specifically, is relied on frequently under the Hague/Hague-
Visby rules.2 The chapter considers the allocation of the burden of proof as well as the
allocation of the risk of loss between the cargo owner and the carrier under the regime
as part of an assessment of the carrier’s liability in terms of the regime.
The types of contracts of carriage considered in this dissertation are contracts for the
carriage of goods by sea evidenced by bills of lading.3 The focus is on cargo claims
for the loss of or damage to the goods. The parties to such a claim are referred to in
this dissertation as the claimant and the carrier.  The claimant would ordinarily be the
holder of the bill of lading and/or the owner or party bearing the risk of loss in and to
the goods, and the carrier as defined in the rules ‘includes the owner or the charterer,
who enters into a contract of carriage with the shipper.’4
1 The Hague-Visby Rules - The Hague Rules as Amended by the Brussels Protocol 1968
, available at https://www.jus.uio.no/lm/sea.carriage.hague.visby.rules.1968/doc.html, accessed on 03
January 2017.
2 J Hare Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 2 ed (2009) 799. Also see R Aikens… et al Bills
of Lading 2 ed (2016), who states that the fire exception is an important exception at 363.
3 H/HV art 1(b) 'Contract of carriage' applies only to contracts of carriage covered by a bill of lading or any
similar document of title, in so far as such document relates to the carriage of goods by sea, including any bill
of lading or any similar document as aforesaid issued under or pursuant to a charter party from the moment at
which such bill of lading or similar document of title regulates the relations between a carrier and a holder of
the same.
4 H/HV art 1.
72.2 Background to The Hague/ Hague Visby rules
The Hague rules were drafted in the 1920’s as a result of the need that had arisen to
create an international regime that would facilitate international trade. It needed to
accommodate two purposes:5
1. To create a liability regime that would enable a fair allocation of risks between
the carrier and the cargo owner;6 and
2. To prevent the abuse of power and to protect those who have less bargaining
power.7
The Hague/Hague-Visby rules originated from the Harter Act. The Harter Act was
passed in 1893 with the aim of curtailing the carrier’s right to contract out of liability
whilst decreasing the standard of seaworthiness to a minimum standard.8 In 1921 the
Maritime Law Committee prepared a model bill of lading which incorporated rules from
the Harter Act, and they drafted other rules with the aim of bringing uniformity to the
carriage of goods by sea, resulting in the adoption of the Hague Rules in 1924.9
Further work was carried out on the 1924 rules and they were the subject of the
international protocol to the 1924 convention adopted at Brussels in 1968; the Hague-
Visby rules.10The Hague-Visby rules provide satisfactory protection for the cargo
interests and govern a large amount of international shipments.11
The regime is criticised for being outdated to an extent in that it does not make
provision for modern transport, as it was created long before multimodal transport
became a regular mode of transporting the goods.12
5 T Nikaki and B Soyer ‘A new international regime for carriage of goods by sea: Contemporary, certain,
inclusive and efficient, or just another one for the shelves?’ (2012) 30 (2) Berkeley Journal of International Law
303.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Hare op cit note 2 at 623.
9 Ibid at 624.
10 F Reynolds ‘The Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules, and the Hamburg Rules’ (1990) 7 Australian and New
Zealand Maritime Law Journal at 22.
11 T Nikaki op cit note 5 at 304.
12 A Von Ziegler, ‘The Liability of the Contracting Carrier’, (2008-2009) 44 Texas International Law Journal, 44,
330.
82.3 Seaworthiness
Seaworthiness can be defined as ‘a degree of fitness which an ordinary, careful and
prudent owner would require his vessel to have at the commencement of her voyage
having regard to all of the probable circumstances of it.’13
With regards to vessel seaworthiness it is not a concept that concerns only the physical
fitness of the vessel, for example where the vessel is damaged or has an engine
malfunction.14 Vessel seaworthiness is a broad aspect which covers the vessel’s
equipment, the competency of the crew, documentation and any issue that may
possibly affect the fitness of the vessel and its efficiency to encounter the ordinary
perils of the sea.15
The physical seaworthiness of the vessel covers:
‘the state of the vessel itself, i.e. its readiness to encounter the ordinary perils of the
sea that may be faced during its voyage, taking certain factors into consideration, that
being, the type of vessel, its age, the type of navigational water, the route it is going to
take, and the time of the year at which it is going to embark on the journey’.16
In order to ensure the seaworthiness of a vessel, the carrier is required to exercise
due diligence.
2.4 Due diligence
Under the Roman and English law systems the carrier was under an absolute duty to
provide a seaworthy ship.17 However, this was changed when the international
regimes adopted the due diligence approach.18 The English Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act of 1971 and the South African Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1 of 1986 provide
that under no circumstance will there be an absolute undertaking to provide a
seaworthy ship in a contract of carriage of goods by sea.19 Due diligence applies to
13 McFadden v Blue Star Line, [(1905) 1 KB 697] 607.
14 A H Kassem, The Legal Aspects of Seaworthiness, (LLD Thesis, University of Wales, 2006) at 25.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Hare op cit note 2 at 640.
18 Ibid.
19 Hare op cit note 2 at 640 , Also see sec 3 of the English Carriage of Goods by Sea Act and sec 1  of the South
African Carriage of Goods by Sea Act- which states that ‘[t]here shall not be implied in any contract for the
carriage of goods by sea to which the Rules apply by virtue of this Act any absolute undertaking by the carrier
of the goods to provide a seaworthy ship.’.
9all contracts of carriage and according to the provisions of the Hague-Visby Rules ‘the
carrier must exercise due diligence before and at the commencement of the voyage
to make the ship seaworthy’.20
The restriction in the regime is thus that the use of due diligence in making the ship
seaworthy is only at the beginning of the voyage21 and does not continue throughout
the voyage.
It is required of the carrier to ensure that the vessel is fit and that he has exercised
due diligence before his vessel sails. The carrier will need to prove that he exercised
due diligence in order to guard himself against liability for any damage or loss that may
occur. If the carrier had exercised due diligence before and at the beginning of the
voyage then he will not be liable for any loss resulting from unseaworthiness that ‘could
not have been discovered by the use of due diligence’.22
The seaworthiness of the vessel entails being dependant to a great extent on the
different circumstances that surround the voyage. This could mean the various waters,
the weather conditions for that voyage, the season of the voyage and so on.23
A causative connection must exist between the unseaworthiness and the loss. Proof
that a ship went to sea in an unseaworthy condition does not establish a breach of the
bill of lading contract.  It must be shown that the unseaworthiness was the actual cause
of the loss.24 Therefore, the cargo owner bears the onus of proving that the vessel
was not in a seaworthy condition when she set to sea on her voyage, and that the loss
would not have occurred had it not been for the unseaworthiness of the vessel.25
The carrier’s main obligation is to take reasonable steps to ensure that the equipment
on the vessel, together with all other parts of the vessel, including its engine, are in
‘good condition’ ‘before and at the beginning of the voyage’.26 It was held in the case
20 Article 3(1) of the H/HV, Also see Hare op cit note 2 at 640.
21 Article 3(1) of the H/HV, Also see A Von Ziegler op cit note 12 at 330.
22 R Force, ‘A Comparison of the Hague, Hague Visby, and Hamburg rules: Much ado about (?)’ (1995-1996) 70
Tulane Law Review 2061.
23 A H Kassem op cit note 14 at 25.
24 Hare op cit note 2 at 640.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
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of Union of India v NV Reederij Amsterdam27, that a failure to exercise due diligence
is tantamount to negligence.28
A recently decided South African case, Viking Inshore Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Mutual and
Federal Insurance Co Ltd is a marine insurance case,29 which is only relevant to this
dissertation based on its second issue which was a question of due diligence. In this
case, a fishing vessel called the Lindsay had collided with the Ouro do Brasil, a bulk
juice carrier that was on a voyage from Singapore to Santos, Brazil.30 The collision
resulted in the sinking of the fishing vessel and many lives were lost.31 The Lindsay
was owned by Viking Inshore (Pty) Ltd (hereinafter referred to as the insured), who
had been insured by Mutual and Federal Insurance Co Ltd (hereinafter referred to as
the insurer).32 The insured sought to rely on Inchmaree clauses in the marine
insurance contract which made provision for the cover of loss or damage to the vessel
caused by ‘any accident or by negligence, incompetence or error of judgement of any
person whatsoever’.33 The policy stated that the cover provided was subject to the
proviso that the loss or damage has not resulted ‘from want of due diligence by the
Insured, the owner or any person at a superior level of management’.34 The insured
had claimed from the insurer to recover for the loss of their fishing vessel, and this
claim was repudiated.35 The insurer repudiated the claim on the grounds that there
was a breach of warranty by the insured as they did not comply with the Merchant
Shipping Act in that the crew on watch were not properly certified.36
The court, in an obiter remark, compared the reference to “due diligence” in Inchmaree
clauses to the Hague/Hague-Visby rules requirement that ‘the carrier is required
before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due diligence to make the ship
seaworthy; properly to man, equip and supply the ship; and to make the holds
27 Union of India v NV Reederij Amsterdam [1963] 2 Lloyd's List Rep 223, 235.
28 S C Derrington, ‘Due diligence, causation and Article 4(2) of The Hague Visby Rules’, (1997) 3 Int'l. Trade &
Bus. L. Ann. 176.
29 Viking Inshore v Mutual & Federal Insurance Co Ltd 2016 (6) SA 335 (SCA).
30 Viking Inshore supra note 29 at para 1.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid at para 2.
33 Ibid at para 4.
34 Ibid at para 4.
35 Ibid at para 50.
36 Ibid at para 1.
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refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship in which goods are
carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation’.37 The court
remarked that the rules create ‘a positive obligation resting on the carrier to exercise
due diligence’.38 The court cautioned that this is not necessarily the same thing as
demonstrating that loss or damage to an insured vessel was caused by a want of due
diligence.39
Despite this caution, the court, referring with approval to the work of Professor Rose40
remarked further that in the case of a carrier’s obligations under the Hague/Hague-
Visby rules ‘it is necessary for the carrier to show the exercise of reasonable care’.41
However, in relation to the marine insurance policy in question the court approved the
view that the insured only need discharge proof of due diligence when the insurer has
‘provided some evidence that the cause of the loss or damage was a want of due
diligence’.42 It was however, found that it was not necessary to ‘express a firm view in
regard to the onus of proof on this issue and whether it rests on the insurer to show a
causal want of due diligence or on the insured to show that there was no want of due
diligence’.43 This statement made by the court illustrates that the question as to who
bears the onus of proof, will not always be necessary for the court to consider in those
cases where the facts are clear and no dispute regarding the onus of proof is raised.
The court found that there was no evidence to illustrate any deviation from the
arrangement that had been made between Mr Levendal and Captain Landers, to keep
watch , and that even if there had been a deviation and therefore a neglect of their
duties, it would not result in a want of due diligence by the insurer.44
The court held further that there was no evidence to show that the lack of qualification
had a causative effect.45 The judge considered that there may have been a specific
certification required for the navigational watch but that the MSA did not make any
provision for a specific certification. The court held therefore that there was no ‘proper
37 Viking Inshore supra note 29 at para 1. Although the judgment doesn’t repeat the exact wording of the
Convention, this statement is a reference to the obligations of the carrier contained in sections of H/HV r.
38 Viking Inshore supra note 29 at para 27.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid, citing Francis D Rose Marine Insurance: Law and Practice 2 ed (2012) para 13.12 at 259.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid at para 31
45 Ibid at para 45.
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foundation’ for the insurer’s argument that the loss of the Lindsay was as a result of a
want of due diligence by the insured.46
Some commentators are of the view that in order for a carrier to rely on the exceptions
under the Hague/Hague-Visby rules that protect them from liability, the carrier will have
to have fulfilled his obligation to exercise due diligence to make the vessel
seaworthy.47
It is thus crucial that a carrier employ an expert/surveyor to carry out an inspection to
ensure that everything on the vessel is in working order.48 It is the responsibility of the
carrier to also prove that, if not he, then ‘his servants, agents, or an independent
contractor exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy, and that the defects
which caused the loss or damage were not discoverable even with the help of
competent prudent experts’.49
In the case of The ‘Hellenic Dolphin’50 it was stated that the cargo owner could attempt
to override the use of the exception by proving that the vessel was not seaworthy at
the commencement of the voyage and that ultimately this was the cause of the loss.51
With regards to the burden of proof in terms of seaworthiness, it does not shift from
the claimant but the court can draw inferences from the evidence.52 When the cargo
owner proves that damage has resulted from unseaworthiness of the ship, the carrier
will have the burden of proving that he or she has exercised due diligence in ensuring
that the ship is seaworthy.53
It is clear that the Hague/Hague-Visby rules place a ‘heavy burden’ on the claimant in
terms of the basis of liability. Instead of the carrier having to prove that the vessel was
seaworthy, the claimant must prove that it was not seaworthy.54
46 Viking Inshore supra note at para 49.
47 S C Derrington op cit note 28 at 176. Also see R force op cit note 22 at 2086, F Reynolds op cit note 10 at 18,
S Rares ‘The onus of proof in a cargo claim, articles III and IV of the Hague-Visby Rules and the UNCITRAL Draft
Convention’ (2008) (FCA) FedJSchol 20 at 7.
48 A H Kassem op cit note 14 at 25.
49 Ibid.
50 The Hellenic Dolphin [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 336 at 339.
51 Ibid at 339.
52 S Rares op cit note 47 at 10. Also see A H Kassem op cit note 14 at 168.
53 S Rares op cit note 47 at 10.
54 A Von Ziegler op cit note 12 at 330.
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Von Ziegler argues that taking into consideration the knowledge that the carrier
possesses, it makes more sense for the carrier to prove the seaworthiness of the
vessel rather than to make the claimant prove the unseaworthiness of such vessel.55
Reynolds, on the other hand, assesses the risks borne by both the carriers and the
cargo owners. He argues that the risks between the carrier and cargo owner balance
out in a sense that the carrier will have to apply due diligence in terms of seaworthiness
of the vessel and will have to make provision for adequate care of the cargo.56 In
exchange for fulfilling that obligation, the carrier would not be liable for negligence in
the navigation and management of the ship.57 However, cargo owners’ interests may
see the Hague/Hague-Visby rules as a regime that heads in the direction of the
carriers’ interests.58
2.5 Care of cargo
In terms of article 3 rule 2,59 subject to the provisions of article 4, ‘the carrier shall
properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the
goods carried.’60
It is the duty of the carrier to make certain that cargo is loaded both safely and
timeously.61 The carrier must ensure that the cargo is protected in its entirety.62
There is a duty on the carrier to exercise both care and skill in doing so.63 Precautions
must be taken in order to prevent the goods from being damaged and appropriate
measures must be taken to prevent further deterioration in the case of goods that have
already been damaged.64
The carrier is expected to care for the cargo for the duration of the period of
responsibility of the carrier.
55 A Von Ziegler op cit note 12 at 330.
56 F Reynolds op cit note 10 at 17.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 H/HVR.
60 H/HVR, art 3(2).
61 M D G Ozbek, The carriage of dangerous cargo, duties of the carrier, 2007, 123.
62 Ibid.
63 Ozbek op cit note 61 at 123.
64 Ozbek op cit note 61 at 123.
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The carrier’s obligation to care for the cargo is set out in the case of Albacora SRL v
Westcott & Laurance Line Ltd65 where it was held that the word ‘properly’ has a slight
difference in meaning to the word ‘carefully’. Referring to the case of GH Renton & Co
Ltd v Palmyra Trading Corporation of Panama66 it was held that the word ‘properly’
means that it is in keeping with a ‘sound system’ which could extend further than
merely carrying the goods ‘carefully’.
In the case of the MV Sea Joy67 the claimant had claimed for damages in respect of
cargo that was damaged as a result of improper stowage.68 The claimant based its
claim on article 3 rule 2 of the Hague-Visby rules (as set out in the Schedule to the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1 of 1986).69
The carrier relied on the 'FIOS' (free in and out stowed) term that was included in the
bill of lading and contended that it had no obligation (and nor did the ship owner) in
terms of the loading, stowage or discharge of the cargo.70 The carrier also relied on
article 4 rule 2(i) and (q) and argued that the damage to the cargo was as a result of
either an act or omission by the claimant or its  agent or representative and that this
was not as a result of the fault or privity of the carrier, its agents or servants.71
Stevedores were instructed by the claimant, however, the stevedores did not actually
have any part in the loading and stowage as there was an administrative issue.72 The
charterer had then employed an agent to carry out the stowage.73 The charter party
contract included a clause which provided that 'the charterers are to load, stow, trim
and discharge the cargo at their expense under the supervision of the captain'.74 Upon
inspection, the captain and the surveyor were not satisfied with the arranging of the
cargo and therefore insisted that further measures be taken to secure the cargo.
65 Albacora SRL v Westcott & Laurance Line Ltd [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 53 at 58.
66 GH Renton & Co Ltd v Palmyra Trading Corporation of Panama [1957] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 379 at 388.
67 The MV Sea Joy: Owners of the Cargo lately laden on board the mv Sea Joy v The MV Sea Joy 1998 (1) SA 487
(C).
68 Ibid at 488.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid at 492.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid at 488.
73 Ibid.
74 The MV Sea Joy supra note 67 at 502.
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Nevertheless, the further measures taken, were not up to standard and the Captain
still set sail.75
The inclusion of the FIOS term into the bill of lading was common cause. However,
the issue was whether or not Article 3 rule 2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby rules could be
applied even though the clause made a contrary provision. Furthermore, the issue as
to whether or not Article 3 rule 8 had to be applied.76
Article 3 rule 8 provides that:
‘Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or
the ship from liability for loss or damage to, or in connection with, goods arising from
negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this article or
lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in these Rules, shall be null and
void and of no effect. A benefit of insurance in favour of the carrier or similar clause
shall be deemed to be a clause relieving the carrier from liability.’77
Even though the carrier and claimant could agree on terms providing that the claimant
would arrange the loading and stowage of the cargo at its own expense, the court
stated that this agreement could not relieve the carrier of its ‘overriding obligation’ to
ensure that the cargo is properly and carefully loaded and stowed.78 However, the
court went further to state that such an obligation will be subject, to the provisions of
article 4 rule 2(i) or (q) of the Hague-Visby Rules.79
The court in arriving at its decision, quoted Tetley:80
‘The final responsibility for proper stowage remains in all circumstances with the
carrier. In consequence a clause in the bill of lading stating that the carrier is not
responsible for stowage carried out by the shipper is invalid under art 3(8) of the Hague
or Hague/Visby Rules. Questions of stowage are under the absolute control of the
master of the vessel and as such he has the final say as (to) how stowage is to be
effected. This is so not only because of the carrier's responsibility for the stability of the
75 TheMV Sea Joy supra note 67 at 497.
76 Ibid at 489.
77 Article 3(8) H/HV.
78 The MV Sea Joy supra note 67 at 499.
79 The MV Sea Joy supra note 67 at 499.
80 The MV Sea Joy supra note 67 at 499.
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ship and the safety of the ship and crew, but also because of the carrier's obligation to
care for other cargo.’
The court held that the plaintiff was not liable for the agents’ failure to stow the cargo
properly as these agents were not employed by the plaintiff.81 The court held, further,
that, since the captain had set sail in spite of his reservations regarding the stowage
and lashing of the claimant's cargo, ‘it was at least as likely as not that fault or
neglect on the part of the captain had contributed to the damage’.82 The defendant
could therefore not rely on article 4 rule 2(q) of the Rules.83 In terms of the 'FIOS'
inscription on the bill of lading, the court held that it does not absolve the carrier from
liability, as the carrier retained an ‘overriding’ duty/obligation to properly and carefully
stow the claimant’s cargo on the vessel.84 The carrier did not contract out of liability
for the breach of its overriding obligation and therefore the carrier was held liable for
damages to the claimant.85
In terms of the aspect of fault, there are two fault based systems in place, the proved
fault based system and the presumed fault based system.86 The Hague/Hague-Visby
rules follow the proved fault based system.87 This system entails the cargo owner
proving that the loss or damage is as a result of the carrier’s fault or negligence or due
to the actions of the agents/servants of the carrier.88 If this is not proved, the carrier
will not be held liable.89 Article 4 rule 1 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, makes
provision for the proved fault based system.90
The shifting burden of proof when a claimant alleges a breach of article 3 rule 2 and
when the carrier relies on an exception under artice 4 rule 2 is further discussed in
chapter three.
In the “Hellenic Dolphin”91, mentioned above, Lloyd J had also said that a prima facie
case could be brought against a ship-owner by illustrating that the cargo that was
81 The MV Sea Joy supra note 67 at 504.
82 The MV Sea Joy supra note 67 at 497.
83 The MV Sea Joy supra note 67 at 497.
84 The MV Sea Joy supra note 67 at 504.
85 Ibid.
86 A H Kassem op cit note 14 at 141.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 H/HVR, Article 4 Rule 1.
91 The Hellenic Dolphin supra note 50 at 339.
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shipped ‘in good order and condition was out-turned damaged or in bad condition’.92
In such scenario there is automatically a prima facie breach of article 3 rule 2.
Therefore, the carrier would be liable ‘unless’ he is able to prove that the damage or
loss is as a result of a circumstance which protects him under article 4 rule 2
exceptions.
2.6 Period of responsibility of the carrier
It is ultimately the responsibility of the carrier to properly care for the cargo even though
some acts or failure to act may be that of the master or crew. The duty of the carrier
to care for cargo extends from the beginning of the voyage and applies throughout the
voyage.93
In terms of the period of application and responsibility, the carrier will be responsible
from the beginning of the loading of goods on to the ship until the end of the discharge
of the goods from the ship.94 The Hague/Hague-Visby rules do not extend
responsibility beyond the carriage of the goods.95
This ‘tackle to tackle’ period of responsibility is dissatisfactory to an extent as it does
not provide for accountability for damage to cargo during periods before or after the
carriage.  It excludes the period at the ‘port of loading and at the port of discharge’96
even though the carrier had “charge” of the cargo before and after the voyage.97 It
would also exclude from the compulsory application of the rules any earlier or later
period of carriage or storage under a multimodal contract of carriage.
92 The Hellenic Dolphin supra note 50 at 339.
93 F Berlingieri, ‘A comparative analysis of The Hague visby rules, The Hamburg rules and The Rotterdam rules’
2009 at 5, available at
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/workinggroups/wg_3/Berlingieri_paper_comparing_RR_Hamb_HVR.pdf,
accessed on 28 March 2018.
94 Ibid at 5.
95 S R Mandelbaum ‘Creating uniform worldwide liability standards for sea carriage of goods under the Hague,
COGSA, Visby and Hamburg conventions’ (1996) 23 Transp. L.J. 471 at 487.
96 R Force op cit note 22 at 2058.
97 J C Sweeney, ‘UNCITRAL and the Hamburg rules-The risk allocation problem in maritime transport of goods’
(1991) 22 J. Mar. L. & Com. at 519.
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2.7 Role of the Bill of lading as Proof
Van der Linden has described the bill of lading as follows:
‘The master gives the shipper a written acknowledgement of the goods loaded on
board, containing a statement of the goods, their quantity, marks and numbers, the
place of destination, the name of the freighter and often also of the consignee and the
freight stipulated for.’98
According to article 3 rule 3 of the Hague/Hague-Visby rules, ‘upon demand of the
shipper the carrier shall issue to the shipper a bill of lading that sets out the leading
marks for identification of the goods as well as the number of packages, pieces,
quantity, weight and condition of the goods.’99
The Hague/Hague-Visby Rules lists information that must be stated in the bill of lading.
The duty to issue the bill of lading falls on the carrier.100 Once the bill of lading is issued
it then becomes evidence of the terms of the contract of carriage.101 If there is any
inaccurate information provided on the bill of lading, the carrier will bear the
consequence of being held liable to the consignee.102 The shipper must ensure that
the information provided on the bill of lading is accurate, however, if the carrier
suspects that the goods are not in good condition as set out by the bill of lading, the
carrier may refuse to issue the bill of lading in that form, and may clause the bill of
lading with a reservation.103
Article 3 rule 4 of the Hague/Hague-Visby rules emphasises the importance of the bill
of lading as proof.104 It provides that the bill of lading is a form of prima facie evidence
between the carrier and the shipper.105 Inter alia, it serves as evidence between the
carrier and the consignee that the goods were received in good condition as set out in
the bill of lading.106 However, proof of the contrary will be inadmissible when the bill of
98 Hare op cit note 2 at 690. Also see Roos v Rennie (1859) 3 S 253 at 261.
99 H/HVR.
100 R Low ‘Replacing the paper bill of lading with an electronic bill of lading: Problems and possible solutions’
(2000) 5 Int'l. Trade & Bus. L. Ann. at 159.
101 R Aikens… et al Bills of Lading 2 ed (2016) at 54.
102 A A Sefara Basis of carrier’s liability in carriage of goods by sea (unpublished LLM Thesis, University of Oslo,
2014) at 17.
103 Ibid.
104 H/HVR.
105 H/HVR. Also see R Aikens op cit note 101 at 102, para 4.24.
106 H/HVR. Also see R Aikens op cit note 101 at 102, para 4.24.
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lading has been transferred to a third party acting in good faith.107 The order and
condition of the goods shipped, provided for in the bill of lading, cannot be contradicted
by the carrier.108 Aikens makes reference to section 4 (b) of the UK COGSA which
provides that in the hands of the lawful holder, the bill of lading becomes conclusive
evidence against the carrier.109
2.8 Exemptions from liability
The carrier’s exemptions from liability are dealt with in Article 4 rule 2.110 The
Hague/Hague-Visby rules provide that:
‘Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting
from:
(a) Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot or the servants of the carrier
in the navigation or in the management of the ship;
(b) Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier;
(c) Perils, dangers and accidents of the sea or other navigable waters;
...
(m) Wastage in bulk or weight or any other loss or damage arising from inherent
defect, quality or vice of the goods; and
…
(q) Any other cause arising without the actual fault or privity of the carrier, or
without the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier, but the
burden of proof shall be on the person claiming the benefit of this exception to
show that neither the actual fault or privity of the carrier nor the fault or neglect
of the agents or servants of the carrier contributed to the loss or damage..’
107 R Aikens op cit note 101 at 110 para 4.50.
108 Ibid at 114 para 4.65.
109 Ibid at 112 para 4.59.
110 H/HVR.
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2.8.1 Nautical fault exception
The nautical fault exception is said to be the most controversial defence.111 A carrier
will not be responsible for any loss or damage that arises from any act, neglect or
default of the carrier in the navigation or management of the ship.112
Whether or not a carrier has responsibility depends on defective management of the
vessel. If there is a ‘vessel management default’ then the ship owner may escape
liability to the cargo owner.113 Prior to the nautical fault rule, carriers were subjected to
a strict level of liability.114 Carriers were liable for any damage that occurred even
though technology was not sufficiently advanced at that point in time to allow a carrier
to prevent damage and effectively manage its ship and crew from afar.115
Carriers take the view that the nautical fault rule provides for an equal distribution of
risks116 and ensures that there is a balance of the risks between cargo and carrier
interests. In terms of this defence the carrier will not be liable for negligent acts or a
negligent failure to act by the master and crew in relation to the navigation or
management of the vessel.117 The critics of the exception point out that it ‘goes against
the vicarious liability doctrine’ and is not justified.118
Maritime technology has become more advanced over the years and therefore carriers
have the ability to control the ship and its crew through technology.119 Shippers are of
the view that the advanced telecommunications of this day allows ship owners to
maintain constant verbal and visual contact with their ships and crew, and therefore
the contention that ship owners are unable to control their vessels at sea is a thing of
111 S R Mandelbaum op cit note 95 at 487. Also see Hare op cit note 2 at 799.
112 E S Lee, S O Kim, ‘A carrier’s liability for commercial fault and default in navigation or management of the
vessel’ (2000) 27 Transp. L.J. 205 at 213.
113 Ibid at 205.
114 Liang and Li ‘Abolishing the exemption of liability for fault in ship management in the nautical fault
exemption system’(2006) China oceans L.R. 537 at 539-542.
115 T Nikaki, B Soyer op cit note 5 at 329.
116 S R Mandelbaum op cit note 95 at 488.
117 L T Weitz, ‘The Nautical Fault Debate (the Hamburg Rules, the U.S. COGSA 95, the STCW 95, and the
ISM Code)’ (1998) 22 Tul. Mar. L.J. 581 at 588.
118 S R Mandelbaum op cit note 95 at 488.
119L T Weitz op cit note 117 at 587.
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the past.120 Carriers should be able to prevent loss from occurring.121 It is for this
reason that it is said that the nautical fault exception is one that is outdated.122
However, there may be situations that arise where the ship-owner will be unable to
sufficiently control and monitor the vessel or the crew.123 There may also be a situation
where the ship-owner may not be aware of the events or acts that led to the negligence
in management of the vessel as the master and crew may be withholding certain
information.124 Another example would be where a breakdown of technology hinders
effective communication between the ship-owner and the carrier which would result in
preventing the ship-owner from directing its captain or crew.125
The application of the nautical fault rule can be seen in the Tasman Orient Line CV v
New Zealand China Clays and Others (The Tasman Pioneer)126. The case was
decided under the Hague/Hague-Visby rules.127 The ship was set on a voyage from
Yokohama, Japan to Busan and Korea.128 The master on board had taken it upon
himself to make the decision to change the route in order to pass through the inner
island instead of the initial route which was to have gone around the island.129
The ship then struck the island rocks.130 The master had not attempted to establish
whether the ship had suffered any damage and this failure to act, resulted in him not
being able to establish that there was in fact a hole in the hull causing water to enter
the vessel.131 The master had also failed to notify the coastguard and the ship-owner
of the situation at hand.132 If the master had notified the coastguard, the claimant’s
cargo could have been saved.133 Furthermore, in an attempt to conceal what he had
done, the master had gone through the route that was planned initially.134
120 S R Mandelbaum op cit note 95 at 488.
121L T Weitz op cit note 117 at 587.
122 F Reynolds op cit note 10 at 28.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 F Reynolds op cit note 10 at 28.
126 Tasman Orient Line CV v New Zealand China Clays And Others(The Tasman Pioneer), 2009 NZCA 135, Lloyd’s
Rep Vol 2, 308.
127 Ibid at 313.
128 Ibid at 310.
129 Ibid .
130 Ibid at 311.
131 Ibid .
132 Ibid at 308.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid at 313.
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The master had misadvised the vessel manager and had further instructed the crew
to lie that they had taken the route initially planned and that the ship was struck by an
unidentified floating object.135
The matter was then taken to the High Court and the issue was whether the master’s
actions fell under article 4 rule 2(a) of the Hague-Visby Rules, that being acts ‘in the
navigation or in the management of the ship’.136 The court held that the act of neglect
or default must be bona fide in order to fall under the exception of article 4 rule2(a).137
The court found that Captain Hernandez had devised a plan in order to absolve himself
from liability and therefore the court held that the carrier was not entitled to the use of
the exception.138 The court held further that the carrier was liable for the damage to
cargo.139
An appeal against the judgment was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on the grounds
that the majority had agreed with the judgment of the High Court.140 On a further
appeal to the Supreme Court of New Zealand141 it was held that even though the
master’s conduct was wrongful, it was in the navigation and management of the
ship.142 Therefore the appellant was not held liable to compensate the respondents.143
Aikens cites this case and states that the carrier was entitled to invoke article 4 rule 2
based on the fact that the exception had been ‘designed to protect carriers from the
actions of their employees [which] are beyond their control’.144 Furthermore, Aikens
stated that this did not amount to barratry.145
The writer submits that this case is significant as it illustrates the application of the
nautical fault rule and sheds light on the abuse of this exception as it was relied upon
and accepted even when the master’s conduct was wrongful. The Supreme Court’s
135 Tasman Orient supra note 126 at 310.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid at 320.
141 Tasman Orient Line CV v New Zealand China Clays And Others(The Tasman Pioneer), 2010 NZSC 37, Lloyd’s
Rep Vol 2, 13.
142 Ibid at 16.
143 Ibid.
144 R Aikens op cit note 101 at 360 para 10.220.
145 Ibid.
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reasoning for the decision was that the master’s conduct was reprehensible, however,
that it fell under the navigation and management exception.146
2.8.2 The Fire Exception
The Hague/Hague-Visby Rules exception of ‘fire’ contained in article 4 rule 2 (b) of the
Rules states that:
‘Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or
resulting from fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier’.
If the carrier failed to exercise due diligence in making the ship seaworthy they will not
be able to rely on the fire exception.147 Furthermore, if the fire was caused by the
actual fault or privity of the carrier then they will also be unable to rely on the
exception.148
The English case of The Apostolis149 concerned a fire that broke out during loading
operations, when a cargo of cotton bales caught on fire.150 The issue to be decided on
appeal was whether sparks from the welding works that were performed on the decks
resulting in the sparks coming into contact with inflammable cotton, rendered the
vessel unseaworthy.151
The carrier can rely on the fire exception if the carrier proves that he exercised due
diligence to make the ship seaworthy,152 however, this is subject to the claimant
proving that the fire was as a result of the actual fault or privity of the carrier.153
Irrespective of the fact that welding works were performed on the decks, the court held
that this did not render the vessel unseaworthy. In order for the ship to be rendered
unseaworthy, some aspect of the ship must pose a risk to the cargo on board.154
146The Tasman Pioneer SCA supra note 126 at 18.
147 H/HV.
148 Refer to wording of art 4(2)(b).
149 R Aikens op cit note 101 at 324 para 10.121.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 S Rares op cit note 47 at 32, Also see The Toledo [1995] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 40 at 50.
153 S Rares op cit note 47 at 32, Also see The Apostolis, [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 475 at 483, col. 2; Scrutton on
Charterparties (20th ed.), at 444.
154 R Aikens op cit note 101 at 324.
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In the Canadian case of Maxine Footwear Company Ltd. v. Canadian Government
Merchant Marine Ltd155, a contractor had been employed to thaw out scupper pipes
on the carrier company’s ship as the pipes had been frozen whilst loading.156 An
acetylene torch was used, which in turn set fire to the cork insulation on board.157 A
part of the claimant’s cargo was damaged in the fire and the claimant had then claimed
for the value of the damaged cargo.158 The cargo on the vessel had been stowed after
the fire broke out but before it was discovered.159
The issue was whether or not the carrier could rely on the exception provided for by
article 4 rule 2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby rules. The court a quo held that, the carrier
was entitled to rely on article 4 rule 2.160 The court’s reasoning was that the fire broke
out as a result of the negligence of the crew or employees of the carrier in the
management of the ship, and held further that the fire was not as a result of the actual
fault or privity of the carrier. Therefore, the carrier could rely on article 4 rule 2 (b).161
The majority decision of the Supreme Court was that the carrier had discharged the
burden of proving that they had exercised due diligence and that they were entitled to
rely on the exceptions.162
The carrier submitted that article 3 did not come into operation in cases of fire, even
though the fire rendered the ship unseaworthy, the fire aspect is to be dealt with under
artice 4 rule 2 (b).163 The judges in the Court of Appeal did not agree with this point on
the basis that article 3 rule 1 is an overriding obligation, which, if not fulfilled by the
carrier, will prevent the carrier from relying on the immunities provided for by article
4.164
In terms of the burden of proof aspect, the carrier’s representative had put forward the
proposition that it was for the carrier to discharge its burden of proof that the loss was
caused by an excepted peril and was of the opinion that the carrier had discharged
155 Maxine Footwear Company Ltd. v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine Ltd, [1959] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.
156 Ibid at 106.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid at 112.
160Ibid at 107.
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid.
163 Ibid at 113.
164 Ibid.
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this burden of proof.165 It was argued that the carrier had illustrated that the loss was
as a result of the fire which was not caused by the carrier’s actual fault or privity.166
The carrier felt that this showed the loss occurred as a result of the act or neglect or
default in the management of the ship.167 Further, that if ‘material unseaworthiness’
was confirmed, the burden of proof would shift to the carrier to show that the
unseaworthiness was not by the carrier’s want of due diligence. 168 The court held that
if due diligence was exercised, the unseaworthiness that had occurred would have
been prevented or if the root of such unseaworthiness was established prior to the
loss, the claimant’s loss would have been avoided.169 The court held further that article
3 rule 1, ‘was an overriding obligation, and, if it was not fulfilled and the non-fulfilment
caused damage, the immunities of Art. IV could not be relied on’.170 In conclusion the
court held that the ultimate cause of loss was due to a failure in exercising due
diligence as was required by Article 3 rule 1 of the Hague Visby rules and therefore
the appeal succeeded.171
2.8.3 Perils of the sea defence
The carrier’s most frequently invoked defence is the perils of the sea defence as a
huge amount of the ocean cargo claims are due to heavy weather at sea.172
In an American context the peril of the sea has been defined as:
‘those perils which are peculiar to the sea, and which are of an extraordinary nature or
arise from irresistible force or overwhelming power, and which cannot be guarded
against by the ordinary exertions of human skill and prudence.’173
165 Maxine Footwear supra note 155 at 108.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid at 109.
168 Ibid.
169 Maxine Footwear supra note 155 at 113.
170 Ibid.
171 Ibid.
172 A Trichardt; A Cull ‘Perils of the sea Down under’ (1999) 10 Stellenbosch L. Rev. 436 at 436, Also see Hare op
cit note 2 at 795.
173 Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Gamlen Chemical Co (Australasia) Pty Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 142, para 48,
also see T L. Tisdale, Newsletter, Sea venture issue 4, 01 January 2006, at 5, available at
https://www.steamshipmutual.com/Downloads/Sea-Venture/SeaVenture_4.pdf, accessed on 22 February
2018.
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In the case of J Gerber & Co Inc v The Sabine Howaldt174, the Sabine Howaldt, was
time chartered to Contramar S/A for a voyage carrying steel products from Antwerp,
Belgium to Wilmington, Delaware and Alexandria, Virginia.175 The cargo had been
loaded in good condition, however, upon arrival at the port in the United States, ‘the
steel showed extensive salt water damage from rust and pitting’.176 The vessel had
encountered extremely heavy weather.177
The trial court had found in favour of the contentions of many of the carrier’s experts.178
The trial court was in agreement that the hull was twisted due to the rough seas and
that this was what had led to the sea water entering the vessel.179
On appeal it was held:180
‘that where the vessel was seaworthy at the beginning of the voyage, was operated
in good and seamanlike manner throughout voyage, and there was no negligence on
part of carrier and damage to cargo was caused by hurricane force winds and resulting
cross seas which, through wrenching and twisting the vessels, set up torsions within
the hull which forced up hatch covers and admitted seawater to the holds, loss to cargo
was from peril of the sea and vessel owner was exonerated from liability.’181
However, it was held in the Gamlen Chemical case182 that the American and Canadian
approach differs from the approach taken in England and Australia.  In the latter
jurisdictions, even a reasonably foreseeable weather event can be a peril of the sea.183
The Bunga Seroja184 is an Australian case that dealt with the meaning of the perils of
the sea.185 Trichardt and Cull argue that the case is of significance to South Africa
174J Gerber & Co Inc v S.S Sabine Howaldt, 437 F. 2d 580 (2d Cir. 1971), available at
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/437/580/351945/, accessed on 18 February 2018.
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid.
178 J Gerber supra note 174.
179 Ibid.
180 Ibid.
181 Ibid.
182 Gamlen supra note 173.
183 Ibid at para 48.
184 Great China Metal Industries Co.Ltd v. Malaysian International Shipping Corp. Berhad (The Bunga Seroja)
[1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 512.
185 A Trichardt; A Cull op cit note 172 at 437.
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due to the fact that ‘South Africa like Australia, adopted the Hague Visby Rules and
incorporated it into a schedule to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act’.186
Although not binding, the case aids South African courts in interpreting the meaning
of the perils of the sea defence and to an extent, persuades the decisions of the
courts.187 Although the case was decided under the Hague rules188, the interpretation
of the High Court is also applicable to the Hague-Visby Rules article 4 rule 2(c) as
there is no difference between the interpretation and application of the Hague and
Hague-Visby rules in this respect. In chapter three, the court’s comments on the
burden of proof are examined in more detail, and should not, it is submitted, to be
followed in South Africa.
The Bunga Seroja had been on her journey to deliver goods when heavy weather
occurred at sea.189 The ship’s master was well aware of the fact that the Great
Australian bight is known for its heavy weather.190 Furthermore, the crew had received
a weather bulletin prior to departing Melbourne.191 The bulletin had advised of the ‘gale
warning’.192
The heavy storm had caused major damage to the coils of the containers on board
and therefore resulted in a loss of goods.193
The cargo owner claimed that the carrier was in breach of his obligations under article
3 rules 1 and 2.194 In response the carrier denied that he was  in breach of the
obligations and alleged that he had exercised due diligence in making the vessel
seaworthy as well as all parts of the vessel in which goods were carried fit and safe
for their carriage.195 Further the carrier had relied on the exception of perils of the sea
under article 4 rule 2(c).196
186 A Trichardt; A Cull op cit note 172 at 437.
187 Ibid.
188 Bunga Seroja HCA supra note 184 at para 3.
189 Bunga Seroja HCA supra note 184 at para 4, Also see A Trichardt; A Cull op cit note 172 at 437.
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid.
193 Ibid.
194 Bunga Seroja HCA supra note 184 at para 6.
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid.
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On the facts the question arose whether heavy weather must be unexpected to be
regarded as a peril of the sea.  The court of first instance held, with reference to the
decision in Gamlen Chemical that even a reasonably foreseeable storm was a peril of
the sea.197 This finding was arguably obiter198 but was upheld by the Court of
Appeal199 and the High Court of Australia.200
2.8.4 Inherent Vice Defence
Inherent vice can be defined as a ‘[h]idden defect (or the very nature) of a good or
property which of itself is the cause of (or contributes to) its deterioration, damage, or
wastage.’201
Inherent vice means the unfitness of the goods to withstand the ordinary incidents of
the voyage, given the degree of care which the carrier is required by the contract to
exercise in relation to the goods.202
Despite the fact that the carrier will not be liable for any damage caused by the nature
of the cargo itself, the carrier is still expected to exercise due diligence in caring for the
cargo and in its attempt to prevent or minimise the loss or damage caused by such
cargo.203
The principle derived from this exemption is that the carrier will not be held liable if the
damage to cargo is not the fault of the carrier.204 Ultimately the shipper of such goods
should bear the responsibility of guarding against any damage or loss resulting from
inherent vice of the goods and should possess knowledge on the inherent
characteristics of such goods.205
197 Bunga Seroja HCA supra note 184 at para 65-69.
198 Ibid at para 46 stated that on the findings of fact by the court of first instance it was not necessary to
consider the exception.  Also see R Aikens op cit note 101 at 345 para 10.178.
199 Bunga Seroja HCA supra note 184 at para 69.
200 Ibid at para 42.
201 Definition of inherent vice, available at http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/inherent-vice.html,
accessed on 18 March 2018.
202 Ozbek op cit note 61 at 72.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid at 73.
205 Ibid at 73.
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In the case of Volcafe Ltd v Compania Sud Americana De Vapores206 CSAV had
carried nine consignments of coffee in containers that were lined and unventilated.
There was condensation damage to an amount of 2.6 percent of the total value.207
The court of first instance held that CSAV was liable for the damage as they were
unable to show inherent vice and an absence of negligence, that is that they had
properly carried and cared for the goods in terms of what was required under article 3
rule 2.208 The court therefore found in favour of the cargo claimants and held further
that the carrier did not have a sound system in place for protecting the cargo for
carriage.209
Arising from the manner in which the court dealt with the burden of proof the following
issues, inter alia, were taken on appeal:
1. Is a breach of article 3 rule 2 inferred when goods are received in good condition
and delivered in a damaged condition or does that situation give rise to a
‘sustainable cause of action’?210
 If there is an inference of a breach of article 3 rule 2, in order to establish a
prima facie case of inherent vice what will the carrier be required to show?211
2. Was there ‘complete circularity’ between article 4 Rule 2 (m) and article 3 rule
2 such that Rule 2 (m) ‘was not a true exception’?212
3. What must be illustrated in order to establish a ’sound system’?213
206 Volcafe Ltd and Others v Compania Sud Americana De Vapores (trading as CSAV) [2017] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 32.
207 Ibid at 32.
208 Ibid at para 15.
209 Volcafe Ltd and Others v Compania Sud Americana De Vapores (trading as CSAV) [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 649 at
para 48 and 50(Volcafe a quo) Volcafe CA supra op cit note 206 at para 17.
210 B Weijburg, HFW, Briefings available at http://www.hfw.com/Volcafe-Ltd-v-Compania-Sud-Americana-de-
Vapores-SA-December-2016, accessed on 18 March 2018.
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
213 Ibid.
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With regards to the question of circularity between the provisions of article 3 rule 2 and
article 4 rules 2(m), it was held on appeal that there is a ‘clear separation’ between the
use of the inherent vice defence and proving negligence.214
The court held that the ‘carrier need not disprove negligence in order to raise the
defence of inherent vice’.215 It was further held  to be wrong to assume that the inherent
vice defence did not apply to goods that are not defective, when in fact it does apply
when there are inherent qualities in ‘sound’ cargo that render it unable to withstand
the voyage.216
In terms of the issue of there being a sound system, the court held that a sound system
had been in place for the caring of the goods and that a sound system does not entail
preventing damage.217 However, the carrier must have the necessary and required
knowledge regarding the nature of the goods.218 The court held that it is ‘unfair to have
an expectation of the carrier to go beyond what was required by the law’.219
In this case the court found that the carrier had done all that was required by law
accepting the carrier’s expert witness evidence that it acted in accordance with
‘industry practice’.220
It should be noted that there is a measure of overlap between inherent vice and
dangerous goods, and it can be challenging to distinguish dangerous goods from
goods that have inherent defects.221 If the goods on a shipment are of a dangerous
nature, whereby it is possible that they may cause damage or loss to the ship, other
goods or even endanger persons then the goods will be classified as dangerous
goods.222
214 B Weijburg op cit note 210.
215 Volcafe CA op cit note 206 at para 50.
216 Ibid
217 Ibid at para 64.
218 Ibid at para 65.
219 Ibid.
220 Ibid at para 69
221 Ozbek op cit note 61 at 73.
222 Ibid.
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2.9 Conclusion
It is clear that the Hague/Hague-Visby regime has been applied successfully, however
it does not make provision for modern international trade in terms of multimodal
transportation of goods. With regards to the aspect of due diligence, the regime has a
restriction in that the carrier should only exercise due diligence in making the ship
seaworthy at the beginning of the voyage and not throughout the voyage. In terms of
the period of responsibility for cargo, the carrier is not responsible for damage to cargo
before or after the carriage, even though the carrier had charge of such cargo. It is
established that the Hague-Visby rules provide for a balance in the allocation of risks:
the carrier bears the risk of ensuring that the ship is seaworthy and the claimant’s risk
is the defence of navigational error and management. Nevertheless, cargo owners feel
that the regime is more in favour of the interests of the carriers due to the application
of this defence. Carriers on the other hand, are of the view that the nautical fault rule
creates an equal distribution of risks between the carrier and the cargo owner. This
chapter set out the basis of liability under the Hague/Hague-Visby rules and the use
of the proved fault based system.
The next chapter will deal with the manner in which the Hague-Visby rules make
provision for and deal with the burden of proof. The case of Volcafe Ltd v CSAV will
also be dealt with in more detail in the next chapter as it is a recent case that pertains
to the burden of proof.
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CHAPTER THREE: BURDEN OF PROOF AND ORDER OF PROOF
3.1 Introduction
Depending on the circumstance of the case, 1 the rules on the burden of proof can be
crucial and of great significance to the outcome.2 When incidents take place at sea
the cargo owner is not present and may not be able to advance evidence of an event
that led to the damage of cargo. Therefore a claimant will not be able to establish that
the loss or damage to the cargo was caused by the carrier. Thus, the determination of
where the burden of proof lies in such cases ‘has been problematic for the international
maritime community’.3 Force refers to two such instances: when it is not clear how the
damage in question has occurred or where the evidence is in conflict.4 It will be difficult
for a party that bears the onus of proof to discharge the onus of proof. Scholengerger5
and Reynolds6 express similar views about the importance of the burden of proof in
such instances.
Conversely, in situations where the cause of damage is clear from looking at the
evidence provided, the burden of proof may not be critical to the outcome of such
case.7 In this instance, who the risk of loss falls on will need to be established but not
who the burden of proof falls on.8 By risk of loss, Force means the ‘substantive
differences’ between the defences available to the carrier under the different liability
regimes.9
This chapter will commence with an overview of concepts of proof applied in the South
African law of evidence.  The chapter will then discuss an issue that seems to have
surrounded the burden of proof in marine cargo claims for many years, that being
1 R Force ‘A Comparison of the Hague, Hague Visby, and Hamburg rules: Much ado about (?)’ (1995-1996) 70
Tulane Law Review at 2085. Also see C. W. H. Goldie, ‘Effect of the Hamburg Rules on Shipowners' Liability
Insurance’ (1993) 24 J. Mar. L. & Com at 111. Goldie indicates that various countries differ in their application
of the Hague/Hague Visby rules in terms of the burden of proof and the type of evidence required to establish
the exercise of due diligence in making the ship seaworthy.
2 R Force op cit note 1 at 2085.
3 D K Schollenberger, ‘Risk of Loss in Shipping under the Hamburg Rules’ (1981) 10 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y at
568.
4 R Force op cit note 1 at 2085.
5 D K Schollenberger op cit note 3 at 570.
6 F Reynolds, ‘The Hague Rules, The Hague Visby Rules, and The Hamburg Rules’ (1990) 7 Austl. & N.Z. Mar. L.J.
at 29.
7 R Aikens… et al Bills of Lading 2 ed (2016). Aikens says the burden of proof is often a theoretical and not a
practical problem.
8 R Force op cit note 1 at 2085.
9 R Force op cit note 1 at 2085.
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whether or not it will suffice for a carrier to prove that an exception applies in order to
absolve the carrier from liability or whether the carrier will have to prove both that an
exception applies and that they were not negligent in the care of the cargo. The starting
point of this discussion is the case of The Glendarroch10.  The case of Gosse Millerd
v Canadian Government Merchant Marine Ltd (The Canadian Highlander)11 being one
of the first cases decided after the enactment of Hague rules into English law in the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 192412 will then be discussed to show a significant
change from the position adopted in the Glendarroch.13 In terms of Australian law the
Bunga Seroja case14will be discussed as well as the most significant recent English
case on this issue, being the Volcafe case.15
3.2 General Principles of Evidence in South Africa
The Hague/Hague-Visby rules apply in South Africa by virtue of the South African
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1986 as a schedule to the Act.16 When a South
African court hears a cargo claim, it will apply the Hague-Visby rules (unless another
regime is applicable to the contract) against the background of South African
procedural rules of evidence.17
10 Glendarroch, The (CA) [1894] P.226.
11 Gosse Millerd v Canadian Government Merchant Marine Ltd (The Canadian Highlander) [1927] 2 KB 432.
12 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924.
13 The Glendarroch supra note 10.
14 Great China Metal Industries Co. Ltd v. Malaysian International Shipping Corp. Berhad (The Bunga Seroja)
[1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 512 (Bunga Seroja HCA).
15 Volcafe Ltd and Others v Compania Sud Americana De Vapores (trading as CSAV) [2017] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 32
(Volcafe CA)
16 J Hare Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 2 ed (2009) at 625.
17 K Hopkins ‘International Law in South African Courts’ (2001) De Rebus-SA Attorneys Journal, Acrhived issues,
available at https://www-mylexisnexis-co-
za.ukzn.idm.oclc.org/Index.aspx?permalink=emIvemtmYWEvYnN4aGEvc3pqYmEvdHpqYmEvNmhuYmEvcWZkd
WEkLTEkNyRMaWJyYXJ5JGRwYXRoJExpYnJhcnk, accessed on 25 November 2018. This author states that an
international source of law should be carefully scrutinised to establish its applicability to South Africa.
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3.2.1 The distinction between ‘burden of proof’, ‘order of proof’ and ‘evidentiary
burden’
The information that we provide to a court in order to establish certain facts is
‘generally termed evidence’.18 Evidence is presented to court by bringing forward the
documents relevant to the case, witnesses, objects, photographs and other relevant
material.19
In cases where the defendant is of the opinion that the plaintiff has not discharged his
or her evidentiary burden, the defendant can make an application for absolution from
the instance at the close of the plaintiff’s case.20 In this situation the test to be applied
is ‘whether there is evidence upon which a court, applying its mind reasonably to such
evidence, could or might (not should, nor ought to) find for the plaintiff’.21 The test to
be applied when the court grants absolution from the instance at the close of the
defendant’s case (that is after hearing evidence for both parties) is different, namely:
the judge will grant an absolution from the instance ‘where the evidentiary burden is
on the plaintiff and neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has been able to establish a
case or defence on a balance of probabilities’.22
The case of Control Chemicals (Pty) Ltd v Safbank Line Ltd and Others (Mv Recife)23,
was not a cargo claim by a cargo owner but a case in which the carrier had sought
damages from the shipper of dangerous cargo.  The Supreme Court of Appeal granted
an appeal and substituted the lower court’s order with a judgment of absolution from
the instance on the basis that the respondent did not discharge its onus of proof.24 In
the earlier judgment the carrier had instituted an action in the provincial division for
damages to both the vessel and cargo and argued that the appellant was liable for
breach of contract as a result of an explosion and an outbreak of fire which it alleged
was caused by the appellant’s cargo of calcium hypochlorite.25 The respondents
claimed that the appellants were liable in terms of article 4 paragraph 6 of the Hague-
18 A Bellengere…et al The Law of Evidence in South Africa, Basic principles (2013) 33.
19 Ibid at 37.
20 Ibid at 37. Also see S Pete…et al Civil Procedure, A Practical Guide 3 ed (2016) at 307.
21 Ibid. Also see Claude Neon Lights SA (Ltd) v Daniel 1976 (4) SA 403 at 409 G-H.
22 S Pete…et al Civil Procedure, A Practical Guide 3 ed (2016) at 308.
23 Control Chemicals (Pty) Ltd v Safbank Line Ltd And Others 2000 (3) SA 357 (SCA) (MV Recife)
24 Ibid at 358.
25 Ibid at 357.
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Visby rules.26 The court of first instance had without any evidence, rejected the
appellant’s possible reasons for the fire, being that the adjacent cargo caught on fire
first or that the cargo caught on fire as a result of the heat from the sun, and accepted
the source of the fire advanced by the respondents as the most probable cause, being
that that there was a defect in the calcium hypochlorite.27 The court of first instance
had therefore found in favour of the cargo owner.28
The court held, that there were no reasons to justify an inference that the explosion
was associated with the calcium hypochlorite and that something ‘extraordinary and
unknown’ could have occurred on the voyage.29 In this type of situation the burden of
proof is an aspect to be decided.30 The respondents had not been able to discharge
the burden of proof by proving that the explosion was either as a result of improper
stowage or the state of the calcium hypochlorite at the time of shipment.31 The judge
stated that the onus of proof remains on the claimant throughout the case.32 The
respondents had therefore ‘failed to establish that the shipment of the 'goods' had
been without the consent of 'the carrier, master or agent' within the meaning of art IV
para 6 of the Hague Visby Rules’.33 It was held that the court of first instance had erred
in not granting absolution from the instance and an order of absolution from the
instance was then granted.34
If a court is satisfied that ‘a fact has been proved’, it then becomes ‘proof’.35 Basically
that happens ‘once evidence has been admitted, assessed and relied on to establish
proof’.36 The word ‘proof relates to the presenting of evidence that the court relies
on’.37
26 MV Recife supra note 23 at 361.
27 Ibid at 357.
28 Ibid at 357.
29 Ibid at 369.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid at 369.
32 Ibid at 365.
33 Ibid at 369.
34 Ibid.
35 A Bellengere op cit note 18 at 34.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
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Tetley states that the term burden of proof ‘determine[s] which party to a suit had the
responsibility of adducing evidence of one particular issue of fact (often referred to as
the ‘evidentiary burden’)’.38
The ‘order of proof relates to the sequence in which the facts or allegations had to be
proven by one party or the other to the suit during the trial’.39
This distinction between the burden of proof and order of proof was understood and
applied in marine cargo claims.40 According to Tetley, there is a ‘ping pong conduct
of a claim’41 and this means that the order of proof moves from the cargo claimant to
the carrier and vice versa.
The question that stems from the term burden of proof is, whether the cargo owner or
carrier will bear the onus of proving their case.
The burden of proof or onus of proof is defined as ‘the obligation to persuade the court,
by the end of the trial, of the truth of certain allegations’.42 The burden of proof may
also be seen as a ‘duty’ that the party has to fulfil in order to be successful in ‘finally
persuading the court that he is entitled to succeed on his claim or defence’.43
In terms of the onus, the general principle is that ‘he who alleges must prove’.44 This
principle is in line with the principles set out in the case of Pillay v Krishna,45 where
Davis AJA said that the burden will rest upon the person that makes the claim.46
An evidentiary burden is different from the burden of proof or onus of proof. It is the
‘duty or burden’ that rests on a party throughout the trial, where at any given time that
party may ‘need to lead sufficient evidence in order to force the other side to
respond.’47 It is often said to be a duty to lead evidence that will give rise to a tri-able
issue.48 It is not a burden of proof because the party need not prove anything.  If no
38 W Tetley ‘The Burden And Order Of Proof In Marine Cargo Claims’ at 3, available at https://www.arbitrage-
maritime.org/fr/Gazette/G37complement/burden.pdf, accessed on 10 April 2018.
39 W Tetley op cit note 38 at 31.
40 Ibid.
41 W Tetley op cit note 38 at 31.
42 A Bellengere op cit note 18 at 34.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid at 36.
45 Pillay v Krishna 1946 AD 946 at 951-2.
46 Ibid.
47 A Bellengere op cit note 18 at 36.
48 PJ Schwikkard and SE Van der Merwe, Principles of Evidence 3 ed (2009) at 576.
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evidence is adduced it will mean that the issue will not be raised.49 If evidence is
adduced and an issue is raised then it will mean that the other party will have the
burden of proving that those facts are untrue.50
In the case of South Cape Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Engineering Management Services
(Pty) Ltd, Corbett JA referred to the Pillay v Krishna case and noted that there are two
‘distinct concepts’, one of which is a duty to satisfy the court that he/she will succeed
on his or her defence/claim and the other is a duty to adduce evidence in order to rebut
a prima facie case presented by the other party.51 Corbett JA defined the evidentiary
burden as ‘the duty cast upon a litigant to adduce evidence in order to combat a prima
facie case made by his opponent’.52
The evidentiary burden usually rests on the plaintiff unless by virtue of admissions by
the defendant during the course of pleadings the burden shifts on to the defendant.53
Once the plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant who
may lose the case if he or she does nothing to defend himself or/herself.54
3.2.2 Prima facie proof
The term prima facie means ‘superficially compelling with the potential to become
conclusive, but still subject to the possibility of being challenged’.55 Therefore
Schwikkand and Van der Merwe describe prima facie proof as that ‘which implies that
proof to the contrary is (still) possible’.56
A prima facie case is a case where there is sufficient evidence to find in favour of the
plaintiff if the other party does nothing to rebut. This means that a prima facie case
may in fact be challenged, and if it is not challenged it becomes conclusive proof.57
Stratford JA defines prima facie proof in the case of Ex Parte the Minister of Justice:
49 PJ Schwikkard and SE Van der Merwe op cit note 48 at 576.
50 Ibid.
51 South Cape Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Engineering Management Services (Pty) Ltd 1977 (3) SA 534 (A) at 548.
52 Ibid.
53 A Bellengere op cit note 18 at 37.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid at 40.
56 PJ Schwikkard and SE Van der Merwe, Principles of Evidence 3 ed (2009) at 20.
57 A Bellengere op cit note 18 at 40.
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In Re Rex v Jacobson and Levy.58 He states that evidence produced by a party who
bears the burden of proof will be regarded as sufficient evidence to ‘call for an answer’
from the other party.59 This means that he has produced prima facie proof that will
become conclusive proof and he ‘discharges his onus of proof’ if the other party fails
to answer. If a dissatisfactory answer is provided it is tantamount to no answer and the
prima facie proof will remain as conclusive proof.60 It is also said that ‘a prima facie
case is established if evidence is adduced which, if accepted, will establish a valid
cause of action in law’.61
3.2.3 Conclusive Proof
The standard of proof in civil cases is on a balance of probabilities.62 This means that
the party that bears the onus of proof must ‘persuade the court that their case is more
probable than that of their opponent’.63 Whether or not they will be able to persuade
the court will depend on the ‘strength of their opponent’s case’.64
3.3 Shifting Onuses and the Duty of Care
Article 4 rule 2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby rules sets out seventeen exceptions and
states that ‘neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage
arising or resulting from’ said exceptions.65
At trial the cargo owner must make out a prima facie case by showing that he/she
delivered the cargo to the carrier in good condition and that the goods were received
in bad order or were not received.66 Once there has been a prima facie case shown,
the burden will shift to the carrier to then prove ‘sufficient’ evidence to overturn the
claimant’s prima facie case.67 There is no such thing as presumed fault of the carrier
58 Ex parte Minister of Justice: In re R v Jacobson and Levy 1931 AD 466 at 478.
59 A Bellengere op cit note 18 at 41. Also see Ex parte Minister of Justice: In re R v Jacobson and Levy supra note
57 at 478.
60 A Bellengere op cit note 18 at 41.
61 Marubeni Corporation; MMSL Pte Limited; MV IVS Crimson Creek v Intergris Co Ltd (A 122/2015)(unreported)
2016 JDR 2103 (KZD) at para 7.
62 A Bellengere op cit note 18 at 34.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 See chapter 2 for discussion on Article 4 rule 2.
66 R Hellawell, ‘Allocation of Risk between Cargo Owner and Carrier’ (1979) 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 357 at 361. Also
see R Aikens op cit note 7 at 337 para 10.158.
67 W Tetley op cit note 38 at 5.
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in cargo claims in terms of the Hague/Hague-Visby rules merely because the goods
were in the carrier’s charge during the period of the carrier’s responsibility.68
The ship owner may escape liability by relying on any one of the above mentioned
exceptions and this in turn will meet the opponent’s prima facie case. With regards to
this aspect, the position will remain the same regardless of whether or not the Hague
or the Hague-Visby Rules are applied. The carrier bears the onus of proving that he
will be able to rely on one of the carrier’s defences listed under article 4 rule 2. The
onus placed on the carrier stems from ‘the common law principle that he who seeks
to rely upon an exception in his contract must bring himself within it’.69
3.4 Concurrent causes of loss under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules
In the case of Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Gamlen Chemical Co (A/Asia) Pty
Limited70, Wilson JJ considered the question of concurrent causes of loss under the
Hague rules. In this case the goods were not properly stowed, however, the carrier
wanted to escape liability based on the fact that there was also a peril of the sea that
contributed to the loss.71 The court held that ‘had the goods been properly stowed, the
damage would not have occurred’. The negligent stowing and the perils of the sea
were concurrent causes of the loss.72
Mason and Wilson JJ said:
‘It seems to us that an accurate reflection of these findings requires one to treat the
two concurrent causes of the loss as inseparable, and therefore joint. The loss would
not have occurred but for the faulty stowage, but on the other hand, the faulty stowage
did not cause the loss by itself. On this view, and treating the matter strictly as a matter
of construction of the rule, it cannot be said that the damage resulted from a peril of
the sea, and the appellant fails.’73
68 D R Thomas The carriage of goods by sea under the Rotterdam Rules 2 ed Lloyd’s List London (2010) at 143
para 8.8 and 8.9.
69 W Tetley op cit note 38 at 4
70 Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Gamlen Chemical Co (A/Asia) Pty Limited (1980) 147 CLR at 163-164
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Gamlen Chemical supra note 70 at 163-164.
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The case of Hilditch Pty Ltd v Dorval Kaiun KK (The “Golden Lucy 1”) (No 2)74 supports
this view as it was held in this case that a carrier will only escape liability if it is proved
that ‘the loss or damage was caused by an excepted peril alone’.75
In America a rule was made in order to aid in dealing with matters that came about
as a result of concurrent causes.  This rule is known as the Vallescura rule.
The term Vallescura rule stems from the rule that was formulated by the United States
Supreme court in the case of Schnell v The Vallescura in 1934.76 The rule was made
under the Harter Act.77
The rule states that:
‘when cargo is lost or damaged for more than one reason, one of which the carrier is
responsible for and the other for which the carrier is not responsible, the carrier must
establish what portion of the loss or damage s/he is responsible for and if s/he fails to
demonstrate his/her portion of liability, then the carrier may be responsible for all the
damage’.78
The rule is still applied under the U.S COGSA.79 The application of the Vallescura rule
results in fairness or may sometimes seem unfair, depending on the circumstances of
each case.80 There are circumstances where it is difficult for the carrier to prove
concurrent causes of loss and he may even lack adequate proof of damage caused
by an excepted peril even when it is clear that there is a concurrent cause of loss.81 In
the case of Thyssen Inc v S/S Eurounity82 the seawater coming into contact with the
vessel had resulted in the rusting of the steel.83 There had been a storm and therefore
a great amount of seawater had entered the holds of the ship. Had it not been for the
74 Hilditch Pty Ltd v Dorval Kaiun KK (The “Golden Lucy 1”) (No 2) 245 ALR 125; [2007] FCA 2014.
75 Ibid.
76 S Rares ‘The onus of proof in a cargo claim, articles III and IV of the Hague-Visby Rules and the UNCITRAL
Draft Convention’ (2008) (FCA) FedJSchol 20 at 15.
77 SB Cannon ‘Navigating uncharted waters of liability apportionment: The Rotterdam rules and American
cargo damage claims’ 2014 Rutgers law review 66 at 478.
78 Vallescura Rule Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM, available at
https://definitions.uslegal.com/v/vallescura-rule/, accessed on 26 March 2018.
79 SB Cannon op cit note 77 at 478. The author referred to the Vallescura as still being good law.
80 Ibid at 481.
81 Ibid.
82 Thyssen Inc v S/S Eurounity No. 89 Civ. 8477, 1993 WL 158511, at 2-3 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1993), aff’d, 21 F.3d
533 (2d Cir. 1994).
83 SB Cannon op cit note 77 at 481.
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storm that amount of seawater would not have entered the holds.84 The carrier was
held liable for the full damage to the cargo as it did not prove that the storm was the
only cause of the damage which means that the seawater could have entered through
the unseaworthy hatches.85 However, it is possible to meet the requirements of the
Vallescura rule as can be seen in the case of Trade Arbed Inc MI v Swallow86, where
the trial court found the carrier had met the requirement of the Vallescura rule in that
the carrier was able to establish the portion of damage that it had caused and the
portion of damage that was not caused by it.87 The carrier had shown which damage
was caused by salt water and which damage was caused by fresh water.88 In terms of
the application of the rule in countries other than the United States, there are 34
countries that are signatories of the Hamburg rules and therefore these 34 countries
apply the Vallescura rule89 as the Vallescura rule is now codified as part of article 4
rule 7 of the Hamburg rules90 which will be discussed in the next chapter.
3.5 Analysis of the Traditional Position: four ‘principles of proof’ in marine cargo
claims91
According to Professor William Tetley, there are four basic principles of the burden of
proof and these principles are applied through the Hague/Hague-Visby rules.92 ‘The
first principle is that a carrier is prima facie liable for all loss or damage to cargo
received in good order and out-turned short or in bad order’.93 This principle is linked
to the Vallescura rule mentioned above as the rule aims to rebut the presumption that
stems from the first principle of proof.94 The first principle reflects the position adopted
in cases such as Edouard Materne v. S.S. Leerdam95 and Transatlantic Marine Claims
84 SB Cannon op cit note 77 at 481.
85 Ibid.
86 Trade Arbed Inc MI v Swallow 688 F. Supp. 1095, 1106-07 (E.D. La. 1988).
87 SB Cannon op cit note 77 at 481.
88 Ibid at 482.
89 United Nations Commission on International Trade law, Status, United Nations Convention on the Carriage
of Goods by Sea (Hamburg, 1978), accessed on 26/04/2018, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/Hamburg_status.html.
90 S Rares op cit note 76 at 16.
91 W Tetley op cit note 38 at 4.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 W Tetley op cit note 38 at 12.
95 Ibid at 6.
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Agency, Ltd. v. M/V OOCL Inspiration96. This is referred to by Rares as the ‘traditional’
approach.97 Tetley asserts that the principle was already well established prior to the
Hague Rules coming into effect.98
The first principle operates as an inference that the loss had occurred whilst the goods
were in the carrier’s charge which renders the carrier prima facie liable. The bill of
lading serves as prima facie evidence of the receipt of the goods by the carrier in good
condition and the fact that prima facie proof is rebuttable means that the carrier can
‘overturn the claimant’s prima facie case’, by proving the existence of an excepted
peril.99
In the case of Edouard Materne v. S.S. Leerdam100 the following was noted:
‘It is well established that a carrier of goods by sea is prima facie liable for damage to
cargo received in good condition but which is out turned in a damaged condition at the
end of the voyage, unless the carrier can show that the immediate cause of the
damage is an excepted cause for which the law does not hold him responsible’.101
In terms of making a prima facie case against the carrier, it was held in the case of
Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Ltd. v. M/V OOCL Inspiration102 that a prima facie
case of liability of the carrier can be established in two ways.103 The first is by ‘adducing
direct evidence’ of the condition in which the cargo was delivered to the carrier and its
damaged condition on outturn’.104 Secondly, a prima facie case may be established
by illustrating that the nature of the damage is coherent with the theory that the
damage occurred whilst in the carrier’s charge.105 An example of adducing direct
evidence is by putting in evidence of a clean bill of lading on delivery and of there
being a damaged condition at outturn. This case is an example of the second way of
96 Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Ltd. v. M/V OOCL Inspiration 137 F.3d 94, 1998 AMC 1327 (2 Cir. 1998).
Also see W Tetley op cit note 37 at 8.
97 S Rares op cit note 76 at 18.
98 W Tetley op cit note 38 at 5.
99Ibid at 4.
100 Edouard Materne v. S.S. Leerdam 143 F. Supp. 367 at p. 369, 1956 AMC 1977 at p. 1980 (S.D. N.Y. 1956).
101 Ibid at 369.
102 Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency supra note 96 at 94.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency supra note 96 at 94.
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proving a prima facie case whereby the court in this case had found that the nature of
the damage was due to seawater wetting and that this was irrevocably associated with
an at sea occurrence which means that the carrier had charge of the goods when the
damage occurred.
The question is whether or not the carrier must both prove an excepted peril and
disprove its own negligence to care for the cargo in order to rebut the inference of
liability. This is what occurred in some of the old English decisions.106 However, in
more recent English decisions it has been held that ‘the carrier may rebut the
claimant’s prima facie case by merely proving that the loss was due to an excepted
peril.107 However it can be said that whilst proving an excepted peril, the carrier also
proves an absence of negligence on his part.108
Tetley’s second principle of proof is that the parties are obliged to prove all of the facts
that are at their disposal/available to them.109 Since the carrier has charge of the cargo
from the time they receive the cargo until it is delivered, they have the ‘principal burden
of proof’.110 Thus, they may attempt to prove certain facts by using the information
provided by the master, crew and servants as to what exactly had happened.111 This
second principle justifies the Vallescura rule.112
In the case of American Tobacco Co. v. Goulandris113, the second principle of proof
was applied but in this case it was applied to the cargo owner. It was held that if the
damage was caused due to the initial condition of the tobacco at the time of shipment
then the cargo owner must bear the loss. The Court held further that ‘[i]t seems
reasonable to place the burden of proof on the shipper once damage is shown to have
been of internal origin for he is clearly the one who has access to the information on
this question.’
In the case of Caemint Food Inc v Lloyd Brasileiro114, the judgment emphasised a
similar view. The court held that it is fair for the burden to rest on the plaintiff of showing
106 W Tetley op cit note 38 at 10.
107 Ibid at 11.
108 Ibid.
109 W Tetley op cit note 38 at 15.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid at 12.
113 American Tobacco Co. v. Goulandris 281 F. 2d 179 at 182, 1962 AMC 2655 at 2659 (2 Cir. 1960).
114 Caemint food Inc v Lloyd Brasileiro 647 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1981).
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the condition of the packaged goods upon delivery as the plaintiff has ‘superior access’
to  this information while the carrier on the other hand would have ‘superior access’ to
information regarding what had occurred after receiving the goods.
Tetley’s third principle of proof is that the ‘onus of proof means making proof to a
reasonable degree’.115 This principle was applied in the case of Dominion Tankers Ltd
v Shell Petroleum Co. (John A. McDougald).116 The vessel had lost gasoline and the
carrier stated that this was as a result of a stranding which had damaged the hull of
the ship.117 The claimant on the other hand took the position that the gasoline had
been pumped overboard in order to decrease the weight of the ship.118 On appeal it
was held that the carrier’s explanation for the damage and loss was in fact ‘reasonable
and consistent with the occurrence of the stranding and damage to the ship’.119 The
carrier therefore would not have to prove all the circumstances of the loss, only those
necessary to establish to a reasonable degree that an excepted peril occurred.120
Furthermore, the case of States Marine Corp. v. Producers121 indicates that the carrier
has an ‘ordinary burden of proof’. This means that the burden of proof is on the
‘preponderance of evidence and need not show clear and convincing proof’.122
Lastly, Tetley’s fourth principle of proof relates to ‘concealment, modification or
destruction of key evidence’.123 The manner in which this principle is applied is that
once a party ‘conceals, modifies or destroys evidence’, all other evidence brought
forward by that party is seen as suspicious.124 This principle of proof is seldom applied
in comparison to the three other principles and will not be further discussed.125
115 W Tetley op cit note 37 at 24.
116 Dominion Tankers Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co. (John A. McDougald) [1939] Ex. C.R. 192 at p. 203, [1939] AMC
541 at p. 551.
117 Ibid at 551.
118 Ibid.
119 Dominion Tankers Ltd supra note 116 at 551.
120 W Tetley op cit note 38 at 24.
121 States Marine Corp. v. Producers 310 F. 2d 206, 1963 AMC 246 (9 Cir. 1962).
122 Ibid.
123 W Tetley op cit note 38 at 25.
124 W Tetley op cit note 38 at 25.
125 Ibid.
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Tetley’s four principles will be considered further below in relation to case law dealing
with the shifting onus of proof when the carrier relies on an exception, and the question
of whether it is for the carrier to disprove negligence.
3.6 The position in terms of the burden of proof prior to the Hague Rules
At common law the cargo owner must prove the damage or loss and the carrier will
have the burden of proving that the damage or loss falls under one of the exceptions
or is not as a result of his fault.126 The burden of proving that the carrier is not entitled
to the use of the exceptions based on negligence is for the cargo owner to prove.127
Proof of damage or loss raises an inference of breach of article 3 rule 2 and the burden
rests on the carrier to rebut.128 The common law approach is still important as it is
similar to that of the approach in the Hague/Hague-Visby rules.129
In the Glendarroch case130, the carrier had relied on the perils of the sea exception.131
The bill of lading had not made any provision for loss due to the carrier’s servants’
negligence in the navigation and management of the vessel.132 The court a quo held
that the carrier will have to prove that a peril of the sea exception applies as well as
that the peril was not caused by its own negligence.133 The decision was reversed on
appeal.134 It was held that the onus is on the claimant to prove the contract and that
the carrier must prove that the loss was as a result of perils of the sea.135 If they did
so, the burden of proving that the carriers were not entitled to the benefit of the
exception on the basis of negligence was on the parties who alleged it, who in this
case were the claimants.136
126 R Aikens…et al op cit note 7 at 337.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid at 341.
129 Ibid at 388.
130 The Glendarroch supra note 10 at 226.
131 The Glendarroch supra note 10 at 226, Also see R Aikens op cit note 7 at 198 para 10.25
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 The Glendarroch supra note 10 at 231. Also see R Aikens op cit note 7 at 199 para 10.27.
136 The Glendarroch supra note 10 at 232. Also see R Aikens…et al op cit note 7 at 337 para 10.158, The Torenia
[1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 210, 217 and Joseph Constantine Steamship Line v Imperial Smelting Corporation [1942]
A.C. 154.
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3.7 The position after the Hague rules
The Gosse Millerd v Canadian Government Merchant Marine Ltd (The Canadian
Highlander)137 case was one of the first to be decided after the Hague rules had come
into force.138
Cargo was delivered damaged possibly due to rain water.139 The carrier had relied on
several exceptions in article 4 rule 2 including 2(q).140
Article 4 rule 2(q) reads:
‘Any other cause arising without the actual fault or privity of the carrier, or without the
fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier, but the burden of proof shall be
on the person claiming the benefit of this exception to show that neither the actual fault
or privity of the carrier nor the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier
contributed to the loss or damage.’
Unlike the other exceptions in article 4 rule 2, it expressly indicates that the carrier
must prove that it was not negligent. The judge held that ‘the provision in rule 2(q) that
it was for the carrier to disprove its own fault or neglect or that of its servants’, also
applied to the rest of the exceptions.141 The judge took the view that it was sufficient
for the cargo owner to merely prove that the goods were received in good condition
and out-turned damaged, and that they did not have to go further and prove that the
carrier was negligent.142 The judge went on to say that:143
‘The general rule applicable in English law to the position of bailees is that the bailee
is bound to restore the subject of the bailment144 in the same condition as that in which
he received it, and it is for him to explain or to offer valid excuse if he has not done so.
It is for him to prove that reasonable care had been exercised.’
137 Gosse Millerd supra note 11 at 91.
138 Casmine Brief on the Volcafe case, Para 38, available at
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5b2897fd2c94e06b9e19ead3, accessed on 28 November 2018.
139 Gosse Millerd supra note 11 at 91.
140 Casmine Brief on the Volcafe case op cit note 138 at para 38.
141 Gosse Millerd supra note 11 at 103.
142 Ibid.
143 Casmine Brief on the Volcafe case op cit note 138.
144 R D Claassen ‘Bailment’ The English term bailment is similar to the contract of deposit known under Roman
Dutch law- available at https://www-mylexisnexis-co-
za.ukzn.idm.oclc.org/Index.aspx?permalink=QkFJTE1FTlQkMzg5MDQ2MyQ3JExpYnJhcnkkSkQkTGlicmFyeQ,
accessed on 27 November 2018.
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In coming to its decision the court had relied on a passage from the case of F.C
Bradley and Sons Ltd v Federal Steam Navigation Company Ltd145 whereby the
contract of carriage provided for several exceptions as well as for the incorporation of
the Australian Carriage of Goods Act.146 Some of the goods were out-turned damaged
and Viscount Summer held that:
‘On proof being given of the actual good condition of the apples on shipment and of
their damaged condition on arrival, the burden of proof passed from the consignees to
the ship owners to prove some excepted peril which relieved them from liability . . . and
to negative negligence or misconduct of the master, officers and crew with regard to
the apples during the voyage and the discharge in this country.’147
The decision in the Gosse Millard case is inconsistent with the principle that he who
alleges must prove, whereas the decision in the Glendarroch case is in line with this
principle.148
Since Judge Wright’s application of this formulation of the onus of proof the judgment
in the Gosse Millard case has been applied in many other cases, to name a few,
Borthwick and sons Ltd v New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd149, Phillips and Co (Smithfiled)
Ltd v Clanline Steamers Ltd150, and Svenska Trakttor Atkie Balaget v Maritime
Agencies(Southhampton) Ltd.151
In the case of Borthwick v New Zealand Shipping152 Roche J followed the judgment of
Wright J in the Gosse Millard case153 and stated that if goods were received in good
order and condition and delivered damaged this would mean that the carrier must
145 F.C Bradley and Sons Ltd v Federal Steam Navigation Company Ltd 27 Ll.L.Rep at 396.
146 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1991, http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/viewdb/au/legis/cth/consol_act/cogbsa1991196/, accessed on 27 November 2018.
147 F.C Bradley and Sons Ltd supra note 145. at 396.
148 Weightmans, Burden of proof for cargo claims under Hague Rules,
https://www.weightmans.com/insights/burden-of-proof-for-cargo-claims-under-hague-rules/. Accessed on 27
November 2018. Also see R Aikens…et al op cit note 7 at 337, he quotes from the Glendarroch that ‘If the loss
apparently falls within the exception, the burden of [proving] that the shipow-ner is not entitled to the benefit
of the exception, on the ground of negligence, is upon the person so contending’.
149 Borthwick & Sons Ltd v New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd (1934) 49 Lloyd’s Rep 19 at page 24. See Volcafe
CAsupra note 15 para 39.
150 Phillips & Co (Smithfield) Ltd v Clan Line Steamers Ltd (1943) 76 Lloyd’s Rep 58 at page 61. See Volcafe CA
supra note 15 para 39.
151 Svenska Traktor Aktiebolaget v Maritime Agencies (Southampton) Ltd [1953] 2 Lloyd's Rep 124 [1953] 2 QB
295.
152 Borthwick & Sons Ltd supra note 149 at 24.
153 Ibid.
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show that he exercised reasonable care.154 Therefore the carrier may not only rely on
one of the exceptions provided for but must prove that the damage was not caused by
want of his negligence.155 The defendants produced evidence of the temperatures on
board the vessel being ‘safe and proper’.156 The court accepted the evidence produced
by Mr Swainston (consulting maritime engineer) that a temperature of 17 degrees is
safe and proper for the carriage of normal cargo even though it is not the
recommended temperature of 15 degrees.157 Judgment was entered for the ship
owners and the damage was held to be as a result of inherent vice.158
The case of Phillips v Clanline Steamers159 quoted what Roche J had said about
following the law applicable in the recent formulation in the Gosse Millard case.160
In the case of Svenska Traktor Aktiebolaget v. Maritime Agencies (Southampton)
Ltd161 the court held that there had been no evidence to show that an unexpected peril
had occurred and as a result the carrier had not shown that they exercised reasonable
care of the goods.162 Therefore judgment was entered for the claimants.163 This
decision was also in line with that of the Gosse Millard decision.
In the case of Aktieselskabet de dankse sukkerfabrikker v Bajamar compania Naviera
SA (The Torenia)164, Hobhouse J noted that the burden of proof in terms of proving
negligence is a highly controversial issue.165 Hobhouse J was of the opinion that the
analysis of the burden of proof in the Glendarroch case was the correct approach.166
However he did not make any decision as to whether that approach would be
applicable under the Hague rules.167
154 Borthwick & Sons Ltd supra note 149 at 24.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid at 22.
157 Ibid at 28.
158 Ibid at 19.
159 Phillips & Co (Smithfield) Ltd supra note 149 at 61.
160 Ibid.  Also See Volcafe CA supra note 15para 39.
161 Svenska Traktor Aktiebolaget supra note 151.
162 Ibid at 133.
163 Ibid at 134.
164 The Torenia [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep 210 vol 1.
165 Ibid at 218.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
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In the earlier Australian case of the Minister of Food v Reardon Smith Line Ltd168 the
cargo owner had argued that the carrier must prove that he did not contribute to the
damage in order for him to rely on one of the exceptions. McNair J held that the
common law rule applies to the Hague rules and he said that:
‘The burden of proof shifts from time to time: the cargo-owner first has to make out a prima
facie case of liability which is sufficient to cast upon the ship the obligation of shifting that
onus by proving that the damage was caused by some matter falling within the exceptions,
and then if the cargo-owner in turn wishes to deprive the shipowners of that protection, it is
for the cargo-owner to establish affirmatively (a) that the ship was unseaworthy, and (b) that
that unseaworthiness caused the damage.’169
McNair J’s decision is in line with that of the Glendarroch case.
3.8 Great China Metal Industries Co Ltd v Malaysian International Shipping
Corporation Berhad (The Bunga Seroja)170
This case is a major case in Australian law and was mentioned earlier in chapter 2 in
relation to the perils of the sea defence. In this case, heavy weather had occurred
when the ship was traversing through the Great Australian bight. The storm had
caused major damage to the coils of the containers on board and therefore resulted in
damage and a loss of goods. The issues were whether or not the carriers could rely
on the perils of the sea exception and whether or not the carrier was negligent, both
in relation to exercising due diligence to make the ship seaworthy and in relation to its
handling of the cargo, in particular stowage for the sea passage.
However, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne J.J in their judgment in the Bunga Seroja171
were of the view that the common law principles established in cases such as the
Glendarroch172, cannot serve as an ‘aid’ in interpreting the Hague rules.173 They
reasoned that the Hague rules are a ‘self-contained code’.174 Further, they held that
168 Minister of Food v Reardon Smith Line Ltd [1951] 2 Lloyd’s Rep, 265.
169 Ibid at 271.
170 Bunga Seroja HCA supra note 14.
171 Bunga Seroja HCA supra note 14.
172 The Glendarroch supra note 10.
173 Bunga Seroja HCA supra note 14 para 22. Also see W Tetley op cit note 38 at 9. Also see Martin Davies
‘Application of the Hague Rules Perils of the Sea Defense in Australia: The Bunga Seroja’ (1999) 23 Tul. Mar. L.J.
449 at 460.
174 Bunga Seroja HCA supra note 14 para 22.  Also See W Tetley op cit note 37 at 9. Also see Martin Davies op
cit note 172 at 454.
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the existence of an exception (that is the carrier’s duty to prove the peril of the sea
defence) did not arise as the claimant had not proved unseaworthiness under article
3 rule 1 or negligent handling of the cargo under article 3 rule 2.175
This distinction has significant consequences if the plaintiff does not discharge the
onus of proof in relation to a breach of article 3 rule 2 as it will then lose the case. Thus
it was held that ‘once Justice Carruthers [the trial judge] found that there was no breach
of the carrier’s obligations in this case, the immunities conferred by art. IV, r. 2 became
irrelevant.’176
According to Tetley, the position taken under Australian law is different from the
position taken in other jurisdictions.177 Under Australian law there is no legal onus cast
on the carrier to prove that an exception applies and to illustrate the use of ‘general
diligence and care’ will suffice in allowing the carrier to escape liability for ‘unidentified
harm’ caused to the cargo.178 The carrier will not need to show how the cargo was
harmed.179
Thus Australia is not in line with the other major maritime countries in terms of its
understanding of Tetley’s first principle of proof.  Tetley states that the effect of the
position taken in the Bunga Seroja is that the carrier may escape liability in
circumstances where the cause of loss is unclear or has not been established.180 This
is unlike the application of the Hague/Hague-Visby rules in other jurisdictions where
the carrier is obliged to prove which of the exceptions apply and what exactly caused
harm to the cargo.181 Rares agrees that the decision of the majority in the Bunga
Seroja has departed from ‘the traditional common law application of the onus and
order of proof’, but points out that the comments were obiter.182 He also criticises the
judgment, arguing with reference to the travaux preparatoires of the Convention that
the purpose of article 4 rule 2 ‘was to ensure that the common law concept of exclusion
175 Bunga Seroja HCA supra note 14 para 36. Also see Martin Davies op cit note 172 at 455.
176 Bunga Seroja HCA supra note 14 para 36.
177 W Tetley op cit note 38 at 10.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
180 W Tetley op cit note 38 at 10.
181 Ibid.
182 S Rares op cit note 76 at 19.
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of liability was incorporated into the Rules.’183 Aikens argues that the majority decision
‘does not reflect English law on the point’.184
The decision of the majority can be contrasted with the careful distinction drawn
between the onus of proof and a mere evidentiary burden in the minority decisions in
the case of the Bunga Seroja185 where McHugh J took the following view:186
‘The delivery of goods in a damaged state is evidence of a breach of art. III and
imposes an evidentiary burden on the carrier to show that no breach of art. III has
occurred. But unlike the common law, failure to deliver the goods in the state received
does not cast a legal onus on the carrier to prove that the state of, or non-delivery of
the goods, was not due to the carrier’s fault.’
Kirby J187 and Callinan J188 each referred with approval to the order of proof outlined
in the cases of the Glendarroch and Gamlen.189
It is submitted that the views of the minority cannot be reconciled with the majority
decision and are to be preferred.  While the overall legal onus remains on the claimant,
an evidentiary burden does shift to the carrier to establish facts that would bring him
within one of the exceptions.
3.9 Volcafe Ltd and others v Compania Sud Americana de Vapores SA (Trading
as “CSAV”)190
It can be argued that Volcafe v CSAV is the most significant case in terms of the issue
of the burden of proof under the Hague Rules as it can be shown that it sets this issue
to rest. The facts of this case were discussed in the previous chapter.
The first instance decision by Mr Donaldson QC191 was that where the goods were
loaded in good order and condition and out-turned in a damaged state, then an
inference of breach of article 3 rule 2 would be justified.192 He held further, that, the
183 S Rares op cit note 76 at 21.
184 R Aikens op cit note 7 at 367 para 10.243.
185 Bunga Seroja HCA supra note 14 para 98.
186 Ibid per McHugh J.
187 Bunga Seroja HCA supra note 14 para 154 and 156 per Kirby J.
188 Bunga Seroja HCA supra note 14 para 224 and 225 per Callinan J.
189 M Davies, ‘Application of the Hague Rules Perils of the Sea Defence in Australia: The Bunga Seroja’ (1999)
23 Tul. Mar. L.J. 449 at 460.
190 Volcafe CA supra note 15.
191 Ibid at 33.
192 Ibid.
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carrier would then be required to ‘produce evidence’ in order to establish that he had
not been in breach of his obligations.193 The judge stated that this had to be done prior
to relying on any of the exceptions provided for in article 4 rule 2 of the Hague/Hague-
Visby rules.194
Some of the issues that were not set out in the previous chapter and that arose on
appeal are as follows:
First, must the carrier prove that the damage was inevitable or is there ‘merely an
evidential burden to raise a prima facie case of inherent vice’?195
Secondly, what does the carrier have to establish to raise a prima facie case of
inherent vice?196
Finally, ‘[i]f reliance on inherent vice or other exceptions under article 4 rule 2 can be
negatived by negligence or failure to properly and carefully carry the goods, upon
which party does the burden of proof lie?’197
In terms of the burden of proof, the judge did not agree with the claimant’s argument
being that the carrier is regarded as a common carrier under the Hague rules and that
the carrier would be liable for the damage to the cargo that he is unable to prove was
as a result of inherent vice or another cause in respect of which he was not
negligent.198 The judge stated that this is an incorrect approach to the Hague Rules
internationally.199 This is in line with the comments in the minority decision of McHugh
J in the Bunga Seroja that there is no legal onus on the carrier to prove that the damage
or state of the goods upon outturn was not due to the fault of the carrier.200
In terms of the burden of proof issue the court held that evidence of goods arriving in
a damaged condition does not give rise to a sustainable cause of action but rather is
a fact from which the court can draw an inference of a breach of article 3 rule 2.201 The
court held that there is a four stage process to be followed, whereby the burden of
193 Volcafe CA supra note 15 at 33.
194 Volcafe Ltd and Others v Compania Sud Americana De Vapores (trading as CSAV) [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 649
195 Volcafe CA supra note 15 at 39.
196 Ibid.
197 Ibid.
198 Volcafe CA supra note 15 at 37.
199 Ibid.
200 Bunga Seroja HCA supra note 14 para 98 per McHugh J.
201 Volcafe CA supra note 15 at 40 para 25.
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proof shifts from claimant to carrier, carrier to claimant.202 This decision illustrates that
Tetley’s first principle of proof is now simply wrong as the carrier will not be
automatically prima facie liable for goods that were received in good order and
condition and out turned damaged. This is merely a fact from which the court can draw
an inference that there has been a breach of article 3 rule 2.  The four stage process
is as follows;203
1) ‘The claimant must firstly show that there is an inference of breach;
2) The carrier must then show his defence of an applicable exception;
3) It is then the duty of the claimant to establish negligence on the part of the
carrier;
4) Lastly, if negligence has been established, it is then the carrier’s duty to prove
what part of the damage was not caused by its negligence’.
The judge held that once the carrier is able to show that he may rely on one of the
exceptions, namely the exception of inherent vice in article 4 rule 2(m) in this case, the
burden then shifts to the cargo owner to establish that the carrier was negligent; only
then will the cargo owner be able to prevent the carrier from relying on the exception.204
The court held that:
‘[t]his analysis is consistent with the weight of the authorities, which apply the principles
enunciated in The Glendarroch, even where the Hague Rules apply to the contract of
carriage’.205
Further the court held that this decision is in line with the common law principle that
he who alleges must prove.206 The judge went further to say that:
‘this principle is “one which accords with fairness” and, although the Hague Rules are
to be construed against the background that they are an internationally adopted
convention, I do not consider that there is anything in the Rules themselves which
points to a different construction than that, in relation to exceptions such as article IV
202 Volcafe CA supra note 15 at 40 para 25.
203 Ibid at 40 para 23 to 25.
204 Volcafe CA supra note 15 at 46 para 50.
205 Volcafe CA supra note 15 at 46 para 50.
206 Ibid.
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rule 2(m) (or for that matter other exceptions such as rule 2(c)), the carrier does not
need to disprove negligence to rely upon the exception.’207
The court referred to the three stage analysis put forward by Mr Bryan QC in this case
and stated that:208
‘Where the carrier sets up a case within the exception, it is for the cargo claimant to
establish that the exception does not apply because of the carrier's negligence. That
would seem to be so, whether the burden at stages one and two is a legal one, as the
claimants contend, or only an evidential one. As to whether the burden of proof at the
first and second stages is a legal burden on the cargo claimant to prove delivery in a
damaged condition or non-delivery, then a legal burden on the carrier to establish the
operation of one of the article IV rule 2 exceptions, or merely in each case an evidential
burden, I consider that the better view is that in each case, the burden is a legal one.’
The court is therefore of the view that there is a legal burden that shifts between the
claimant and the carrier. Furthermore that the burden of discharging whether or not a
carrier can rely on the exception, rests on the claimant.209
3.10 Summarising the onus and order of proof
According to Tetley, there are six facts a claimant must prove to make out a case:210
1. ‘That he is the owner of the goods and/or is the person whom is entitled to make the
claim.
2. The existence of a contract.
3. That the person to whom the claim is made is the person who bears the
responsibility.
4. That the loss or damage took place in the hands of the carrier, this is usually done
by proving the condition of the goods when received by the carrier and the condition
at discharge.
5. The physical extent of the damage or the loss.
6. The actual monetary value of the loss or damage.’
207 Volcafe CA supra note 15 at 46 para 50.
208 Ibid at 42 para 35.
209 Volcafe CA supra note 15 at 42 para 35.
210 W Tetley op cit note 38 at 31.
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According to Tetley the burden of proof then shifts to the carrier to prove:211
(a) ‘The cause of the loss.
(b) That he exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy at the beginning of the
voyage, in respect of the loss.
(c) That a Peril of the Sea existed (or another applicable exception).’
The reasoning that Tetley makes for the upholding of this view of the order of proof is
that the obligation to exercise due diligence is an overriding obligation, and a carrier
cannot rely on the exceptions if he has not exercised due diligence.212
Further Tetley argues that:
‘The due diligence provision of article 3(1) of the Hague and Hague Visby Rules, unlike
article 3(2) of those rules obliging the carrier to care properly and carefully for the
cargo, is not subject to the exculpatory exceptions stated in art. 4(2) (a) to (q);’213
Tetley also reasons that the proof of the cause of the cargo loss or damage is more
easily available to the carrier than to the cargo claimant and should therefore be made
by the carrier, according to the second basic principle of proof stated above.
Tetley’s order of proof must be understood in the context of the decision in Volcafe
that an evidentiary burden shifts to the carrier when an inference of breach of article 3
rule 1 or 2 can be drawn from evidence adduced by the claimant. It should also be
added that where a carrier has made out a defence using an exception, it is then for
the claimant to show that the carrier’s negligence negated the use of the exception.214
The decision in the Volcafe case has dealt with the controversial issue of the burden
of proof and has ‘laid to rest’ the alternative approach regarding negligence that was
put forward in the Gosse Millerd case.215
211 W Tetley op cit note 38 at 32.
212 Ibid at 12. Tetley relies on the authority of Maxine Footwear Co Ltd v Canadian Merchant Marine Ltd 1959
Vol 2, 105 at 113.
213 W Tetley op cit note 38 at 34.
214 Volcafe CA supra note 15 at 40 para 25.
215 Hill Dickinson ‘Volcafe & others v CSAV [2016] EWCA Civ 1103’
available at https://www.hilldickinson.com/insights/articles/volcafe-others-v-csav-2016-ewca-civ-1103, 14
December 2016, accessed on 28 March 2018.  Also see Essex Court Chambers Barristers, ‘Court of Appeal
Determines Burden of proof under Hague Rules’ (11 November 2016), available at
https://essexcourt.com/court-appeal-determines-burden-proof-hague-rules/, accessed on 28 March 2018.
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‘It is not for the carrier to disprove its own fault or negligence but for the cargo interests
to positively establish it’.216 This is in accordance with the principle that he who alleges
must prove.217
It is a complete change from the decision by Wright J in the case of Gosse Millerd
whereby it was held that such burden fell on the carrier.218 The burden is no longer on
the carrier in that respect.219
The Volcafe case considered the earlier case of The Torenia220 where it was held that
proof by the claimant of damaged delivery or non-delivery of the goods established a
sustainable cause of action.221 However, the judges did not agree with this decision.
The case of Government of Ceylon v Chandris is also in line with the general principle
of proof and the court in this case held, that the general rule is that the burden of proof
rests on the party claiming the relief.222
216 H Dickinson op cit note 215.
217 Ibid.
218 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
220 The Torenia supra note 164 at 210.
221 Ibid at 211.
222 Government of Ceylon v Chandris [1965] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 204.
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3.11 Conclusion
In conclusion it can be said that the application of the Hague/Hague-Visby rules have
come a long way in terms of applying the burden of proof. Since the decision in the
Volcafe case there is now clarity on the matter. The decision in that case is in line with
the principles from the Glendarroch case and rejects the principle formulated in the
Gosse Millerd decision that the carrier is to disprove negligence as well as prove the
existence of an excepted peril. The carrier proving an excepted peril will be sufficient
in shifting the burden of proof back to the claimant. The next chapter will deal with the
Hamburg rules and the manner in which the Hamburg rules make provision for and
apply the burden of proof. The next chapter will also entail a comparison of the
Hague/Hague-Visby rules and the Hamburg rules in terms of the application of the
burden of proof in the respective regimes.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE BASIS OF LIABILITY AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF
UNDER THE HAMBURG RULES
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter the writer will discuss whether or not the carrier’s duties have changed
under the United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (Hamburg
Rules)1 and if so, to what extent. The writer will go further and establish whether or not
the carrier’s liability has increased substantially and discuss the defences available to
the carrier under this convention. A comparison of the operation of the burden of proof
under the Hague/Hague-Visby rules and the Hamburg rules will then be made and
case law will be used to illustrate this.
In order to analyse the carrier’s liability under the Hamburg rules it is important to
understand the background of the rules and why the rules were created.
4.2 Background of the Hamburg rules
The Hamburg rules were inspired by a report that had been written during the 1970’s
by the secretariat of UNCTAD.2 The legal features of the Hague/Hague-Visby rules
that were found to be at issue at the conference were provisions that favoured carriers
and were not in line with modern day maritime transport.3 The report by the secretariat
set out these issues.4 One of the major issues found was the nautical fault exception.5
The application of this exception is intrinsic to the Hague/Hague Visby-rules as courts
need to establish the difference between a case of unseaworthiness of the ship, and
the management of the ship, as well as between the care of the cargo, and the
management of the ship.6 The Hague/Hague-Visby rules also fail to deal with the
1 United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (Hamburg Rules), 1978, available at
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aconf89d13_en.pdf, accessed on 5 November 2018.
2 F Reynolds ‘The Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules, and the Hamburg Rules’ (1990) 7 Australian and New
Zealand Maritime Law Journal at 27.
3 R R Pixa ‘The Hamburg Rules Fault Concept and Common Carrier Liability under U.S. Law’ (1979) 19 Va. J. Int'l
L. 433 at 440.
4 F Reynolds op cit note 2 at 27.
5 R R Pixa op cit note 3 at 441.
6 Ibid.
59
burden of proof shifting from carrier to cargo owner in cases which deal with concurrent
negligence whereby the carrier shows that an exception applies.7
A draft convention and draft provisions were considered at the U.N conference that
was held on the carriage of goods by sea in Hamburg.8 The convention was then
adopted and twenty seven states, one of which is the United States became
signatories of the convention.9 However, the United States has never ratified the
convention and of the 34 countries10 that are now parties to the convention, none are
ship owning nations or large developed economies and the rules appear unlikely to
attract further support. 11
The Hamburg rules came into force in November 1992 and aimed to balance the risks
between the carrier and cargo owner.12 The Hamburg rules were intended to be a
modern shipping convention which dealt comprehensively with the possible issues of
damage and loss of cargo between the carrier and the cargo owner.13
The principle feature of the Hamburg rules is the new basic rule of liability in article 5.
In terms of article 5(1), the carrier will be held liable unless ‘the carrier proves that he,
his servants or agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid
the occurrence and its consequences’ (own emphasis).14 Therefore most carriers are
not in favour of the Hamburg rules, as they are of the view that it has marked a
fundamental shift from proved fault to ‘presumed fault’, with a consequent reversal of
the ordinary onus of proof in cargo claims under the Hague/Hague-Visby rules.
The Hamburg rules are, however, not clear on the manner in which the burden of proof
will operate.
7 R R Pixa op cit note 3 at 442.
8 R Hellawell ‘Allocation of Risk between Cargo Owner and Carrier’ (1979) 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 357 at 354.
9 Ibid at 355.
10 Status-United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (Hamburg, 1978), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/Hamburg_status.html, accessed on 5
November 2018.
11 B Makins ‘The Hamburg Rules: A Casualty, Part 4-Hamburg rules-Judgment of the International community’
May-June 1994, available at
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07266472.1994.10878383?journalCode=ramo19, accessed on
31 October 2018.
12 R G Bauer ‘Conflicting Liability Regimes: Hague-Visby v. Hamburg Rules - A Case by Case Analysis’ (1993) 24 J.
Mar. L. & Com. at 53.
13 J C Sweeney ‘UNCITRAL and the Hamburg Rules – The Risk Allocation Problem in Maritime Transport of
Goods’ (1991) 22 J. Mar. L. & Com. 511 at 520.
14 Article 5(1) of the Hamburg Rules.
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4.3 Article 5(1) of The Hamburg Rules
Article 5(1) of the Hamburg rules states that:
‘The carrier is liable for loss resulting from loss of or damage to the goods, as well as
from delay in delivery, if the occurrence which caused the loss, damage or delay took
place while the goods were in his charge as defined in article 4, unless the carrier
proves that he, his servants or agents took all measures that could reasonably be
required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences.’
Article 5(1) is regarded as the single test for the carrier’s liability.15 This rule is meant
to take the place of all of the defences provided for in the Hague/Hague-Visby rules.16
The lack of providing a list of defences does not prevent the carrier from relying on
one of the defences listed under the Hague/Hague/Visby-rules, except for the nautical
fault defence.17 The Hague/Hague-Visby rules are said to be ‘impliedly retained’ in the
Hamburg rules.18
Article 5(1) of the Hamburg rules, like its predecessor, is based on a principle of fault
and not strict liability.19 However, the basis for liability is now ‘presumed fault’, in that
it is necessary for the carrier to prove that he is not liable.20
While the division of the burden of proof between carrier and cargo owner under the
Hague/Hague-Visby rules seems to lack clarity,21 the Hamburg rules on the other hand
takes a more unified approach.22 This approach is applied as follows:
The cargo owner must firstly prove that the goods were in the carrier’s charge when
the loss or damage took place.23 The burden will thereafter shift on to the carrier to
prove that the damage or loss was not as a result of the carrier’s neglect or fault.24
15 S M Thompson ‘The Hamburg Rules: Should They Be Implemented in Australia and New Zealand’ (1992) 4
Bond L. Rev. [i] at 174.
16 D A Werth ‘The Hamburg Rules Revisited - A Look at U.S. Options’ (1991) 22 J. Mar. L. & Com. 59 at 68.
17 J Wilson Carriage of Goods by Sea 7 ed (2010) 216.
18 A A Sefara Basis of Carrier’s Liability in Carriage of Goods by Sea (unpublished LLM Thesis, University of Oslo,
2014) at 33.
19 E Selvig ‘The Hamburg Rules, the Hague Rules and Marine Insurance Practice’ (1981) 12 J. Mar. L. & Com.
299 at 305. Also see E S Lee ‘The Changing Liability System of Sea Carriers and Maritime Insurance: Focusing on
the Enforcement of the Hamburg Rules’ (2002) 15 Transnat'l Law. 241 at 246.
20 J J Donovan ‘The Hamburg Rules: Why a New Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea’ (1979) 4Mar. Law. 1
at 7.
21 J O Honnold ‘Ocean Carriers and Cargo; Clarity and Fairness - Hague or Hamburg’ (1993) 24 J. Mar. L. & Com.
75 at 99.
22 Ibid.
23 J O Honnold op cit note 21 at 99.
24 Ibid.
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The Hamburg rules therefore hold the carrier liable from the start up until the carrier
discharges its burden of proof.25
The carrier is assisted in this proof by the insertion of a reservation in the bill of lading,
where he has no reasonable way of verifying the condition of the goods on receipt of
them.26 However:
‘If a clean bill of lading has been issued, prima facie evidence of the taking over of the
goods by the carrier and proof to the contrary by the carrier is not admissible if the bill
of lading has been transferred to a third party, including a consignee, who in good faith
has acted in reliance on the description of the goods therein.’27
This shift in the burden of proof increases the difficulties a carrier will face when
defending a ‘large claim’.28 The Hamburg rules have ‘fundamentally’ changed the rules
on the allocation of risks between cargo owners and carriers and in doing so have
done away with some of the very old concepts.29
The carrier’s risks under the Hamburg rules have been increased in a number of
ways.30 In addition to a heavier burden being placed on the carrier, the duration of the
carrier’s duties are extended, and the Hamburg rules also make provision for liability
as a result of delay in the delivery of goods.31
In terms of article 4 rule (2)(a) of the Hague/Hague-Visby rules the carrier is
exonerated from liability for errors in the navigation and management of the ship as
was previously discussed in chapter two. The detractors of the Hamburg rules believe
that the rules place a heavier burden on carriers.32 Some are of the view that the
Hamburg rules do not allow for a proper and economically efficient allocation of risks
25 F Berlingieri ‘A Comparative Analysis of The Hague-Visby Rules, The Hamburg Rules and The Rotterdam
rules’ 2009 at 8 available at
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/workinggroups/wg_3/Berlingieri_paper_comparing_RR_Hamb_HVR.pdf,
accessed on 21 July 2018.
26 Art 16 of the Hamburg rules. Bills of lading: reservations and evidentiary effect.
27 D E Murray ‘The Hamburg Rules: A Comparative Analysis’ (1980) 12 Law. Am. 59 at 75.
28 C W H Goldie ‘Effect of the Hamburg Rules on Shipowners' Liability Insurance’ (1993) 24 J. Mar. L. & Com.
111 at 114.
29 R Hellawell op cit note 8 at 357.
30 D A Werth op cit note 16 at 72.
31 Ibid.
32 S R Mandelbaum ‘International Ocean Shipping and Risk Allocation for Cargo Loss, Damage and Delay: A U.S.
Approach to COGSA, Hague-Visby, Hamburg and the Multimodal Rules’ (1995) 5 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 1 at 29.
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and one of the reasons for this is the removal of the nautical fault rule.33 It seems that
the Hamburg rules do not achieve the objective to reduce the costs of international
trade on shippers especially in developing countries.34
The proponents of the Hamburg rules on the other hand believe that the rules balance
the risks equally rectifying the position under the Hague/Hague-Visby rules, which
place the majority of the risks of loss on to the cargo owner.35
Professor Tetley has also stated that ‘in most of the cases the Hamburg convention
does not clarify the law at all’.36 He goes further to say that it does not achieve the
desired social balance, that:
‘instead [it] makes concessions to shippers and creates new law in one direction and
concessions to carriers and new law in another all while establishing a third
international convention.’ 37
In Tetley’s opinion, this goes against the goal of uniformity in international trade and
shipping law.38
4.4 The Period of Responsibility under the Hamburg Rules
The Hamburg rules distinguish between the terms ‘carrier’39 and ‘actual carrier’.40
According to the definitions in the Hamburg rules a carrier would be a person who
makes a contract of carriage41 of goods by sea and an actual carrier is a person ‘to
whom all or part of the performance of the carriage has been entrusted’ (also known
33 S V P Rathinam ‘The Hamburg Rules, failure of success?’ 2011, available at
http://pravinrathinam.blogspot.co.za/2011/06/hamburg-rules-failure-or-success-review.html, accessed on 11
August 2011.
34 Ibid.
35 S R Mandelbaum op cit note 32 at 29.
36 B Makins ‘Uniformity of the Law of the Carriage of Goods by Sea in the 1990s: The Hamburg Rules - A
Casualty’ (1991) 8 Austl. & N.Z. Mar. L.J. 34 at 41.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39Article 1(1)-‘"Carrier" means any person by whom or in whose name a contract of carriage of goods by sea
has been concluded with a shipper’.
40 Article 1(2)-‘"Actual carrier" means any person to whom the performance of the carriage of the goods, or of
part of the carriage, has been entrusted by the carrier, and includes any other person to whom such
performance has been entrusted’.
41 Article 1(6)-‘"Contract of carriage by sea" means any contract whereby the carrier undertakes against
payment of freight to carry goods by sea from one port to another; however, a contract which involves
carriage by sea and also carriage by some other means is deemed to be a contract of carriage by sea for the
purposes of this Convention only in so far as it relates to the carriage by sea’.
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as the performing carrier).42 According to the Hamburg rules the contracting carrier
remains liable for the duration of the carriage, being the period ‘while the goods were
in his charge as defined in article 4.’43
Article 4(1) deals with the period of responsibility of the carrier for the care of goods44
and according to this article this period extends further than that provided for in the
Hague/Hague-Visby rules.
‘The responsibility of the carrier for the goods under this Convention covers the period
during which the carrier is in charge of the goods at the port of loading, during the
carriage and at the port of discharge.’45
The period of responsibility is throughout the voyage and for as long as the goods are
in the care of the carrier, including the port of loading and discharge.46 Honnold,47
Donovan48 and Rathinam49 note that this approach is very much like that of
international conventions regarding carriage of goods by road, rail and air.50 The
Hamburg rules thus appear to place sea carriers in the same position as carriers under
the other various modes of transport used in international trade.
There is also a similarity between the Hamburg rules and the Harter Act.51 The latter
Act, which continues to govern domestic sea transport in America, also provides that
the carrier is responsible for the goods for the entire duration of the voyage.52 As
discussed in chapter two, the Hague/Hague-Visby rules did not follow the Harter Act
in this respect, and restricted the carrier’s period of responsibility to the voyage itself
(tackle to tackle). The carrier’s period of responsibility has increased to a great extent
under the Hamburg rules as compared to the period of responsibility under the
42 J O Honnold op cit note 21 at 87.
43 Article 5(1). Also see J O Honnold op cit note 21 at 87.
44 J O Honnold op cit note 21 at 82.
45 Article 4(1).
46 D A L Defossez ‘Seaworthiness: The Adequacy of the Rotterdam Rules Approach’ (2015) 28 U.S.F. Mar. L.J.
237 at 243.
47 J O Honnold op cit 21 at 82.
48 J J Donovan op cit note 20 at 5.
49 S V P Rathinam op cit note 33.
50 Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road 1956 (CMR convention),
Uniform rules concerning the contract for international carriage of goods by rail 1962 (CIM convention) and
The Warsaw convention on International transportation by air 1928 (Warsaw convention).
51 The Harter Act 1893.
52 D E Murray op cit note 27 at 62.
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Hague/Hague-Visby rules.53 Berlingieri, points out that the Hamburg rules clearly
extend the ‘tackle to tackle’ regime of Hague/Hague Visby rules to a ‘port to port’
regime, but this is not the same as covering the whole period the goods are in the
custody of the carrier.54 He gives the example of a carrier who has a terminal outside
the port and thus for the period from when the carrier receives the goods to the period
where ‘they are in charge of the goods at the port of loading’ article 4(1) the Hamburg
Rules might not apply.55
4.5 Seaworthiness
In terms of the carrier’s obligations, the Hamburg rules do not expressly state that the
carrier has an obligation to take reasonable steps to ensure the seaworthiness of the
vessel before and at the beginning of the voyage. However, article 5 is a general
article which makes provision for the carrier’s liability in its entirety.56 In a case of
unseaworthiness, the general rule pertaining to presumed fault would be applied and
the carrier would therefore be presumed to be at fault unless he is able to prove that
the loss or damage, and the unseaworthy state of the vessel which caused it, was not
as a result of the carrier’s fault or the fault of his servants or agents.57 The Hamburg
rules have eliminated reference to ‘due diligence.’ 58 Moreover article 5(1) extends the
seaworthiness obligation to the entire voyage by extending the carrier’s period of
responsibility.59
It is stated that the Hague/Hague Visby rules place a stricter duty to ensure
seaworthiness as compared to the Hamburg rules.60 The duty under the Hague/Hague
Visby rules is non delegable and a carrier will be liable even if he appointed an
independent contractor, whereas under the Hamburg rules the carrier will only need
53 J J Donovan op cit note 20 at 7.
54 F Berlingieri op cit note 25 at 5.
55 Ibid.
56 D A L Defossez op cit note 46 at 243.
57 S V P Rathinam op cit note 33.
58 J J Donovan op cit 20 at 7.
59 R Pixa op cit note 3 at 444.
60 K G Ainuson The Hamburg Rules: Did it increase the liability of the carrier? (unpublished LLM thesis,
University of Georgia, 2006) at 43.
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to show that he exercised reasonable care in the appointing an independent
contractor.61
In the case of the Kuo International Oil Ltd. And Others v. Daisy Shipping Co. Ltd. And
Another62, the relevant contracts of carriage were governed by the Hague rules.63
In this case, there was a defect in the main reduction gearing which led to the propeller
not being able to turn.64 The vessel engaged salvors and declared general average.65
The cargo owners disputed their liability for general average, asserting that the vessel
was unseaworthy.66 This brought to the fore the issue of whether or not the
unseaworthiness of the vessel was caused by the carrier’s failure to exercise due
diligence.67
It was accepted that the burden of proof rested on the carrier, and that in terms of
article 4 rule 1, the carrier must prove either that they have failed to exercise due
diligence, or insofar as they have failed to do so, that this did not cause or contribute
to the incident.68 Aikens continues to cite the case as authority for the position that
the carrier ‘is only liable … if the failure [to exercise due diligence] was causative of
the loss.’69 Similarly, if the carrier invokes the latent defects exception under article 4
rule 2(p) the carrier bears the onus of proof, but will escape liability even if he failed to
exercise due diligence where he can show that the defect was latent, which is by
definition one that could not have been discovered by the exercise of due diligence.70
The defendants had admitted that they did not exercise due diligence because at the
vessel’s last special survey, no thorough inspection of the gear was undertaken.71 The
court accepted that due diligence required that the casing be lifted to perform a
61 K G Ainuson op cit note 60 at 43.
62 Kuo International Oil Ltd. And Others v. Daisy Shipping Co. Ltd. And Another (The Yamatogawa) [1990} 2
Lloyd’s Rep 39.
63 Ibid at 39.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 H/HV art 4 rule 1.
68 The Yamatogawa supra note 62 at 40.
69 R Aikens… et al Bills of Lading 2 ed (2016) at 332 para 10.145
70 Ibid at para 10.282.  Also see D R Thomas The Carriage of Goods by Sea Under the Rotterdam Rules Lloyd’s
List London (2010) at para 8.46 comparing H/HV art 4(2)(p) and Rotterdam rules art 17(3)(g).
71 The Yamatogawa supra note 62 at 48.
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thorough inspection of the gear teeth.72 The court accepted that even with a thorough
inspection, it would not have been possible to detect the defect.73
The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the inspection should have gone further
and involved dismantling the gear as this was not reasonable, being contrary to the
manufacturer’s recommendation (and itself a risky process which might have caused
damage to the gear).74
As the carrier had proved that the exercise of due diligence, weighed on a balance of
probabilities, would not have prevented the casualty from occurring, the claim was
dismissed.75
Bauer analyses the case to consider what the position would have been if the Hamburg
rules were applicable.76 Article 5(1) of the Hamburg rules would have been
applicable.77 As discussed earlier in this dissertation, the Hamburg rules require the
carrier to prove ‘that he, his servants or agents took all measures that could reasonably
be required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences’. Article 5(7) of the
Hamburg rules provide that the carrier will only be liable to the extent of the loss or
damage being attributable to the carrier, but it follows that if the carrier cannot prove
what part of the loss or damage is not attributable to his fault, then he is liable for all
of it.78
If the classification society and its surveyor were regarded as the carrier’s agents79
then Bauer asserts that outcome of the case would probably have been the same.80
The only failure to have exercised due diligence would have been in the 1984
inspection of the vessel but the court would have still have held that the ‘casualty would
have occurred even if due diligence had been exercised’.81
72 The Yamatogawa supra note 62 at 48.
73 Ibid at 45 and 50
74 The Yamatogawa supra note 62 at 50.
75 Ibid.
76 R G Bauer op cit note 12 at 53.
77 Ibid at 58.
78 A similar position was decided in Schnell v the Vallescura 293 US 296, 1934 AMC 1573 (1934).  See R G Bauer
op cit note 12 at 58.  Also see R Aikens…et al op cit note 70 at para 10.146 citing Govt of Ceylon v Chandris
[1965] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 204, at 216.
79 Under the H/HV rules it was established in The Muncaster Castle [1961] A.C. 807 that the shipowner is liable
for the actions of independent contractors.  See R Aikens…et al op cit note 70 at para 10.135.
80 R G Bauer op cit note 12 at 58.
81 Ibid.
67
4.6 The abolition of the nautical fault exception
One of the major and significant changes in the Hamburg rules is the removal of the
exceptions as under the Hague/ Hague-Visby rules and replacing that with a ‘unitary
concept of fault’.82 Bauer discusses the case of the Yawata Iron & Steel v. Anthony
Shipping83, to illustrate how the case would have been decided if the Hamburg rules
were applied. In this case Antonio Demades, a vessel, being a 700 foot cargo ship
was carrying 25 000 tons of steel scrap to Japan.84 On its way to Japan the vessel
sank in the North Pacific.85
The cargo owner (Yawata Iron and Steel) alleged that the carrier was liable for the
vessel’s loss.86 There had been one account of bad weather from the Atlantic Ocean
to the Caribbean Sea.87 The vessel was then re-provisioned and set sail from Balboa
to Japan.88 On the 6th of February the wind force was at a speed of 7 on the Beaufort
scale; the vessel then reduced its speed, and it was at that time that the hatch cover
on the most forward hold had ‘failed and flooded’.89 The wave action on the forward
part of the ship was so intense that the master had to change its course in order to
allow the hatch cover to be examined as an examination of the cover would not be
possible if the vessel was to continue in the direction of the storm.90 It was discovered
that the hatch cover had been twisted in two places and there was no way to re-seal
the cover, since the hold was filled with water. The master had then turned the vessel
back into the direction of Japan and his crew attempted to pump out the water from
the other holds.91
The applicable law governing the carriage in this case was U.S COGSA.92
82 R Pixa op cit note 3 at 443.
83 Yawata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. v. Anthony Ship. Co., Ltd., 396 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) available at
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/396/619/1873414/, accessed on 27 November
2018.
84 Ibid at para 620.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid at para 621.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1936, §1304.
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The defendant’s argument was that they should be absolved from liability based on
two exceptions provided by the U.S COGSA, one that the incident at sea was in fact
a peril of the sea and two that the loss was due to an act by, or the neglect of, the
master in the navigation or management of the ship.93 Under US COGSA the rights
and immunities which the carriers may rely on, are in line with the SA COGSA’s
provision for the carrier’s immunities in that it provides for the carrier’s defences of the
peril of the sea and the error in navigation and management.94
In terms of the first exception, the court held that this was not a peril of the sea as
there were instances of such storms occurring regularly in the North Pacific during the
month of February. Experts from both sides were called to determine the weather
faced by the vessel. The claimant’s expert had erred in his positioning of the ship and
even though it was difficult to establish the exact position, the court was of the view
that defendant’s version was more accurate.95 The court in reaching its decision on
this point, made reference to the case of J. Gerber & Co. v. S.S. Sabine Howaldt96
where Judge Anderson held that force 9 winds have been considered a peril of the
sea in only a few cases.97 The court found that the judgment in that case is in line with
this case.98
In respect of the error in navigation and management exception, the defendants
argued that the Master was liable as he turned the ship around and headed for the
storm instead of continuing to move in the downwind direction until the storm had
subsided.99 The defendant’s architectural expert provided evidence which suggested
that had the vessel continued in the downwind direction, it would have stayed afloat
for a longer duration.100 Furthermore, that there would not have been much wave
93 Yawata Iron & Steel Co supra note 83 at para 622.
94 US COGSA art 2(a) and (c). Also see E C. Radzik, Esq…et al, Understanding the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
46 U.S.C. §1300 et seq at 21, available at http://www.aimuedu.org/aimupapers/COGSAPresentation.pdf,
accessed on 28 November 2018.
95 Yawata Iron & Steel Co supra note 83 at para 623.
96 Ibid. Also see  J. Gerber & Co. v. S.S. Sabine Howaldt 437 F.2d 580, 594-97 (2d Cir. 1971), Facts of which were
discussed in chapter 2 of this dissertation.
97 Yawata Iron & Steel Co supra note 83 at para 623.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid at para 624.
100 Ibid.
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action had the ship remained in a downwind direction.101 It was found that when the
Master turned the ship in the downwind direction, an inspection was able to be carried
out unlike that of the direction of the storm which did not allow for an inspection of the
vessel.
The court agreed with the expert’s view that if the vessel was able to remain afloat for
a longer duration, the pumping efforts and repairs would have been more effective,
and furthermore, there would not have been as much water entering the vessel.  The
court concluded that the defendant’s expert was correct in stating that the vessel may
not have sunk if the master did not reverse the vessel and sail back into the storm.102
Thus the court held that the defendant fell within the nautical fault exception as the
ship would not have sunk if it were not for the master’s decision to turn the ship back
into the storm’s direction.103 It was established that the defendant had discharged its
burden of proof in this respect and that the burden then shifted to the claimant to prove
that the vessel was unseaworthy.104
The claimant alleged that the vessel was unseaworthy for the following reasons: the
ship had insufficient bunkers, the progressive flooding in holds one and two were as a
result of the vessel being structurally unsound, hatch cover on hold no 1 was not
altered properly and lastly that the vessel was overloaded.
In terms of the insufficient bunkers, the court had examined the evidence and held that
the evidence did not show that there were insufficient bunkers.105 Furthermore, the
ship was not unseaworthy because of insufficient bunkers as there was a reserve fuel
supply of around 25% when the vessel had sailed from Balboa.106 It was held that ‘the
sufficiency of the fuel supply was not a factor in the cause of loss’.107
On the issue of inadequate repairs on the hatch cover of hold 1, it was held that
evidence of stresses to the holds when the ship was grounded did not infer that there
101 Yawata Iron & Steel Co supra note 83 at para 625.
102 Ibid at para 626.
103 Ibid at para 625.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid at para 626.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
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were inadequate repairs performed. Furthermore, the independent surveyor in Japan
reported that the repairs were adequately performed.108
It was concluded by the court that although the failure of the no. 1 hold hatch cover
was not explained, the plaintiff had ‘not established that it was due to improper repairs
of prior damage or unauthorized structural modification’.109
With regards to the issue of structural inefficiencies,110 the court held that there was
nothing to show that this was the case and in terms of the issue of overloading.111 The
vessel was not overloaded and therefore not unseaworthy on any of the above
mentioned grounds.112
In conclusion the court held that the defendant was able to bring himself within the
nautical fault exception and that the plaintiff was unable to prove unseaworthiness of
the vessel.113 The court held further that the carrier exercised due diligence to ensure
that the vessel was seaworthy, and for these reasons found in favour of the
defendant.114
According to Bauer’s analysis, if this case were to be decided under the Hamburg
rules, it is unclear what the outcome would be.115 The case may be decided either for
or against the defendant.116 Furthermore, he states that there is an absence of the
nautical fault defence under this regime, however, that the master’s error may ‘have
been an error in judgement’.117 According to Bauer, the issue would then be whether
or not the master acted reasonably in all ways, considering the circumstances.118 He
then goes further and adds that the master’s act could in fact be reasonable under
these circumstances.119 The court would probably have to look at whether any
reasonable master would have acted this way or made the same or similar decisions
in these circumstances.
108 Yawata Iron & Steel Co supra note 83 at para 627.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid at para 628.
111 Ibid at para 630.
112 Ibid at para 631.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 R G Bauer op cit note 12 at 61.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
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Detractors of the Hamburg rules, typically arguing for the carrier’s position, take the
view that the Hague/Hague-Visby rules are more appropriate as they have carefully
specified each defence, whereas the Hamburg rules merely replace the seventeen
defences with three defences which leave room for vagueness and inconsistencies.120
The carriers see this as a ‘step back in the legal process’.121 Furthermore, a ‘removal
of the defences weakens the ship owners position’, although a contrary view is that a
removal of the specified ‘exemptions’ is not excluding those as defences, provided the
carrier can prove his negligence was not the cause of the loss.122
On the former view the removal of the nautical fault rule is a ‘fatal flaw in the Hamburg
rules’123 as the nautical fault defence is significant in the allocation of risks under the
Hague/Hague-Visby rules.124 The United Kingdom was averse to the elimination of the
nautical fault rule and was of the view that eliminating the error in navigation and
management defence would lead to an increase in the cost of maritime transport
thereby having a negative effect on international trade as a whole.125 The United
Kingdom was of the view that the increase of the carrier’s exposure to risk results in
an increase of insurance costs.126
Supporters of the Hamburg rules, typically taking the position of the cargo owners, are
of the view that the Hamburg rules leave all the defences in place under the wording
of the three defences and only excludes the nautical fault rule. They are of the view
that the Hamburg rules is a simplified regime as the rules do not contain the long list
of exceptions provided for under the Hague/Hague-Visby rules.127 Some believe that
this has resulted in a unified burden of proof and more clarity in maritime law.128 It is
also believed that the Hamburg rules are more predictable than the Hague/Hague-
120 S R Mandelbaum op cit note 32 at 487.
121 Ibid.
122 C W H Goldie op cit note 28 at 114.
123 F M Hannah ‘Adoption of the Hamburg Rules in Australia and New Zealand’ (1993) 9 Austl. & N.Z. Mar. L.J.
33 at 43.
124 F M Hannah op cit note 123 at 43.
125 J J Donovan op cit note 20 at 9.
126 Ibid.
127 E Selvig op cit note 19 at 306.
128 Ibid.
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Visby rules and therefore will lead to a decrease in litigation costs,129 and enable a
proper distribution of the risk of loss, especially in a case of negligence. Conversely
detractors of the Hamburg rules argue that the nautical fault exception is a legal tool
that was used to balance the risks between the carrier and the cargo owner,130 and
does in fact ensure an equal distribution of risk.131
Honnold’s analysis shows that the exceptions in article 4 rule 2(b)-(q) ‘are probably
still available’.132 Goldie concurs as the carrier can escape liability by proving an
absence of fault.133 Likewise, Rathinam states that for the majority of exceptions in
article r rule 2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby rules, the effect of replacing the specific
exception with a unitary fault concept is ‘minimal’.134 However, under the unitary
concept of fault, the exception for negligence in the navigation and management of
the ship,135 the so-called nautical fault exception, is entirely excluded.136
The removal of the nautical fault exception is thus a material change which Rathinam
calls ‘a major shift in the carrier’s responsibility’.137 The vicarious liability of the carrier
in respect of his employees and agents is now encompassed under the general
provision.138 The nautical fault exception was criticised as it is not in keeping with the
principle of vicarious liability that is applied in most countries and as such is regarded
as a ‘privilege’ for ship owners/carriers.139
The exception is criticised for being at odds with the care of cargo provision, in article
3 of the Hague/Hague-Visby rules,140 and for lacking clarity -so crucial in risk
management- on the extent of the application of the error in navigation and
management exception.141 It is also argued by some that increasing the liability of the
129 M F Sturley ‘Changing Liability Rules and Marine Insurance: Conflicting Empirical Arguments about Hague,
Visby, and Hamburg in a Vacuum of Empirical Evidence’ (1993) 24 J. Mar. L. & Com. 119 at 121.
130 L Yonggang; L Zhongsheng ‘Abolishing the Exemption of Liability for Fault in Ship Management in the
Nautical Fault Exemption System’ (2006) China Oceans L. Rev. 537 at 542.
131 S R Mandelbaum op cit note 32 at 29.
132 J O Honnold op cit note 21 at 99.
133 C W H Goldie op cit note 28 at 114.
134 S V P Rathinam op cit note 33.
135 H/HV Art 4(2)(a).
136 R Pixa op cit note 3 at 444.
137 S V P Rathinam op cit note 33.
138 E Selvig op cit note 19 at 306.
139 Ibid at 310.
140 E S Lee; S O Kim ‘A Carrier's Liability for Commercial Default and Default in Navigation or Management of
the Vessel’ (2000) 27 Transp. L.J. 205.
141 E S Lee; S O Kim op cit note 140 at 207.
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carrier would lead to a reduction in insurance costs as there would be less damage to
cargo as a result of the higher standard of care.142
Murray, taking a view based on the American experience, asserts that the
Hague/Hague-Visby rules were developed primarily to immunise the carrier from
liability, whilst the Hamburg rules ‘have taken exactly the opposite approach’.143 This,
Murray argues, can be seen from the opposite applications of these two conventions
to a situation involving the crew’s negligence in the navigation of the vessel. Under the
Hague/Hague-Visby rules the carrier would be absolved from liability in the case of
negligence in navigation of the ship whereas, under the Hamburg rules, the carrier will
need to show that all reasonable measures were taken to avoid the occurrence. Only
when the carrier is able to prove this will he be absolved from liability. Murray may be
overstating the point when he suggests that carrier exoneration was the primary focus
of the Hague/Hague-Visby rules, by overlooking the extent to which the Hague/Hague
-Visby rules sought a compromise between absolute liability, on the one hand, and
contractual exclusion of all liability on the other. The aim of the Hague/Hague-Visby
rules was not to immunise carriers from all liability but to achieve a fair balance of risks
between ship owner and cargo owner. As discussed in chapter 2, many commentators
attribute the success of the Hague/Hague-Visby rules to its accomplishment of this
delicate balancing act. Nevertheless, Murray does identify an important shift in
approach to this balancing of risks, which is illustrated by the provisions relating to
carrier negligence, and he is not alone in criticising the Hague/Hague-Visby rules as
being inclined more towards the carrier’s interests than the cargo owner’s interests.144
Article 4 Rule 2(a) of the Hague/Hague-Visby rules provides:
‘Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or
resulting from an Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants
of the carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship.’145
This is a very wide exception, and according to Bauer probably has its origins in the
era of sailing vessels ‘when the owner lost control of his ship as soon as it vanished
142 M F Sturley op cit note 129 at 121.
143 D E Murray op cit note 27 at 63.
144 J A Maher; J D Maher ‘Marine Transport, Cargo Risks, and the Hamburg Rules, Rationalization or Imagery’
(1979) 84 Dick. L. Rev. 183 at 201. Also see D E Murray op cit 27 at 63.
145 H/HV rules, Article 4 rule 2(a).
74
over the horizon’.146 The reason for this was that technology was not advanced during
that period of time and this made the carrier’s task a difficult one in terms of navigation
and monitoring of the vessel’s systems.147 The nautical fault was seen as a reasonable
exception that took into consideration the interest of the public as well as created an
equal balance of the risks in terms of costs that would be borne as a result of damage
or loss.148 The nautical fault rule also led to a substantial increase in the development
of the international shipping industry, however, in this modern day the notion that ship-
owners cannot control the vessel at sea does not exist any longer as
telecommunications are so advanced that the ship-owner is able maintain both verbal
and visual contact with the captain and crew at all times.149
The rule also provided for a broad protection for the carriers as the tasks on board the
vessel are performed by the employees most of the time and therefore no liability could
be passed on to the carrier if he did not actively perform any of the tasks or get involved
with the management of the vessel.150 It is for this reason that even though the
Hague/Hague-Visby rules were seen as a ‘good compromise between carriers and
cargo owners’, it is now such that there is a ‘growing dissatisfaction’ with the Hague
and Hague-Visby rules.151 The technology is such that the nautical rule is no longer
the legal tool that creates the balance of risks.152 In fact it seems as though it has now
become an aid to the carriers and it gives the carriers a greater advantage to escape
liability even though they could and should prevent the damage or loss. It is unfair to
allow a carrier to escape based on the negligence of its employees.153
Most critics of article 4 rule 2(a) agree that today a ship-owner can retain close control
over the vessel. Weitz argues that the risk of loss should be placed on the carrier as
opposed to the cargo owner since the carrier is in the position to prevent damage or
loss from occurring.154 Furthermore, according to Weitz, it is unfair to allow a carrier to
escape liability using negligence and that the use of the nautical fault defence affords
146 R G Bauer op cit note 12 at 54.
147 L Yonggang; L Zhongsheng op cit 130 at 543.
148 Ibid.
149 S R Mandelbaum op cit 32 at 28.
150 F M Hannah op cit note 123 at 49.
151 E S Lee op cit note 140 at 244.
152 L Yonggang; L Zhongsheng op cit note 130 at 543.
153 S R Mandelbaum op cit note 32 at 29.
154 L T Weitz ‘The Nautical Fault Debate (the Hamburg Rules, the U.S. COGSA 95, the STCW 95, and the ISM
Code)’ (1998) 22 Tul. Mar. L.J. at 581.
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protection to some of the shipping industry’s worst performers.155 Thus, the drafters
of the Hamburg rules excluded the errors in navigation and management exception
for the reason that, in their view, the exception placed more of the burden of risk and
losses on to the cargo owners thereby creating an imbalance in the allocation of
risks.156 Further, according to Weitz,157 Katsivela158 and the travaux preparatoires of
the Hamburg rules, the exclusion of the nautical fault exception ‘is consistent with the
aim of harmonizing the international conventions governing different modes of
transport.’159
4.7 The modified fire defence
From as early as 1786 fire statutes were created in England and the United States,
which are said to have influenced the Hague/Hague-Visby rules fire exception.160
The fire exception was not excluded under the Hamburg rules. It was retained and
modified in exchange for the new heavy obligations that the carrier had under the
Hamburg rules to prove that the carrier was not liable for the damage or delay of the
goods,161 and as a ‘horse traders compromise’ for the removal of the nautical fault
exception.162 Article 5(4)(a)(i) of the Hamburg rules states that:
‘The carrier is liable for loss of or damage to the goods or delay in delivery caused by
fire, if the claimant proves that the fire arose from fault or neglect on the part of the
carrier, his servants or agents’
It is clear that the only major burden of proof requirement on the cargo owner under
the Hamburg rules is in relation to the fire exception.163 The Hague/Hague-Visby rules
155 L T Weitz op cit note 154 at 587.
156 R Pixa op cit note 3 at 444.
157 L T Weitz op cit note 154 at 581.
158 M Katsivela ‘Overview of ocean carrier liability exceptions under the Rotterdam Rules and
HagueHague/Visby Rules’ (2010) 40 Revue gendrale de droit at 430.
159 Travaux Preparatoires at 45 para 60, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/travaux/transport/hamburg/A_CONF89_14.pdf, accessed on 17 October
2018.
160 R G Bauer op cit note 12 at 65.
161 J J Donovan op cit note 20 at 5.
162 R G Bauer op cit note 12 at 66.
163 F M Hannah op cit note 123 at 49.
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have a different provision.  Article 4 rule 2(b) of the Hague/Hague-Visby rules states
that:
‘Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or
resulting from fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier’.
Article 4 rule 2(b) refers only to ‘actual fault or privity of the carrier’. This has been
interpreted to mean fault of the carrier’s management not fault of the crew.164 The
cargo owner must prove not only that the carrier’s servants were negligent, but that
the carrier itself was negligent. 165 Under the Hamburg rules a cargo owner can prove
liability by showing fault or neglect either on the part of the carrier, or on the part of his
servants, or his agents. In this respect, the Hague/Hague-Visby rules offered ‘greater
protection’ to carriers.166
However, a second difference in application of the fire defence is that under the
Hague/Hague-Visby rules the carrier could not invoke the fire defence unless he
proved that he had exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy.167 The
Hamburg rules, on the other hand, require the cargo owner to prove both lack of due
care, and that the carrier is liable for the fire.168
In the case of Papera Traders Co. Ltd. And Others v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co.
Ltd. And Another (The Eurasian Dream)169, a fire had broken out on deck 4 of the
Eurasian Dream. The master and crew did not stop the fire and as a result, the cargo
of vehicles was damaged.170 The claimants had argued that the vessel was
unseaworthy and that due diligence had not been exercised.171
The claimants based their argument on two aspects, one of which was that the
defendants were in breach of their obligations under art. 3 rule 1 of the Hague/Hague-
Visby Rules.172 Their alternative case fell under art. 3 rule 2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby
164 R G Bauer op cit note 12 at 67.
165 K G Ainuson op cit note 60 at 43.
166 R G Bauer op cit note 12 at 66.
167 H/HV rules, Article 4(2)(b) read with Article 4(1).
168 F M Hannah op cit note 123 at 49.
169 Papera Traders Co. Ltd. And Others v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. And Another (The Eurasian Dream)
[2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719.
170 Ibid at 720.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
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rules. The claimants argued that the evidence showed the ‘fault or privity’ of the
defendants in respect of the fire exception.173
The claimant’s submission revealed that the vessel was unseaworthy in the following
respects: ‘vessel’s equipment, the competence/efficiency of the master and crew and
in the adequacy of the documentation supplied to the vessel’.174 It was argued that the
crew were not properly equipped in that they lacked proper training, did not have
sufficient walkie talkies, had an insufficient number of working fire extinguishers and
did not take cognisance of what carrying a cargo of vehicles entailed.
In terms of the issue of the burden of proof, the claimants bear the burden of proving
that the vessel was unseaworthy before and at the beginning of the voyage as per
article 3 rule 1, and secondly that the unseaworthiness  caused the loss or damage.175
The burden then shifts to the defendants to show that they exercised due diligence to
make the ship seaworthy.176 Only if the defendant is able to discharge this burden of
proof will he be able to rely on the fire exception as a defence to breaching the
obligations under article 3 rule 2, ‘subject to the claimant proving that the loss or
damage was caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier’.177 Therefore the carrier
may not rely on the fire exception when he has breached the ‘overriding obligation’ to
provide a seaworthy vessel.178
It was found that the vessel was not in a ‘suitable condition’.179 In terms of the vessel’s
equipment, there were insufficient walkie talkies (only 4), which prevented
communication between the officer on duty and the master.180 Upon examination, the
fire extinguishers were found to not have been properly serviced, the CO2 systems
were corroded, there was a shortage of breathing apparatus sets and lastly, two fire
173 The Eurasian Dream supra note 169.
174 Ibid at 744 para 155.
175 The Eurasian Dream supra note 169 at 735, para 123. On this point the case cites The Europa, [1908] P.84 at
pp. 97-98.
176 The Eurasian Dream supra note 169 at 735, para 123. On this point the case cites The Toledo, [1995] 1
Lloyd’s Rep. 40 at 50.
177The Eurasian Dream supra note 169 at 735, para 123. On this point the case cites The Apostolis, [1996] 1
Lloyd’s Rep. 475 at p. 483, col. 2; Scrutton on Charterparties (20th ed.), p.444.
178The Eurasian Dream supra note 169 at 738, para 135. On this point the case cites the case of Maxine
Footwear Co Ltd v Canadian Merchant Marine Ltd 1959 Vol 2, 105discussed in chapter 2.
179 The Eurasian Dream supra note 169 at 742.
180 Ibid.
78
hydrants were tied with ropes and this indicated poor training and incompetence of the
master and crew.181
With regards to the competency/efficiency of the master and crew, it was held that the
master and crew were ignorant in respect of their failure to take cognisance of the fire
hazards that are associated with carrying vehicles as cargo as well as special fire
risks.182 Furthermore that this is as a result of inadequate training. Aikens cites the
Eurasian Dream case to show that seaworthiness does not only entail the physical
aspects; it goes further and considers the equipment, crew and documentation.183
Aikens continues to cite the case to show that ‘a vessel that does not have a sufficient,
efficient, and competent crew is unseaworthy’184. The court held that had there been
proper training, a sufficient number of walkie talkies, serviced fire extinguishers and
proper training and instructions then the fire would have been extinguished and the
damage reduced to only one or two vehicles as opposed to a total destruction of all
vehicles.
The court held therefore that a ‘reasonable prudent owner knowing all the relevant
facts’ would have not allowed the Eurasian Dream to set sail with an incompetent
master and crew who had lacked the proper training.185 The court held further that the
defendants failed to exercise due diligence in all relevant respects and that the
claimants were able to prove that the loss and damage was as a result of the
defendant’s failure to provide a seaworthy vessel.186 It was held that the master and
crew were negligent.
If the Hamburg rules were applied, section 5(4)(a)(ii)187 would be applied, which states
that the carrier is liable:
‘for such loss, damage or delay in delivery which is proved by the claimant to have
resulted from the fault or neglect of the carrier, his servants or agents in taking all
181 The Eurasian Dream supra note 169 at 742.
182 Ibid.
183 R Aikens…et al op cit note 70 at 316.
184 Ibid at 325. On this point he also cites The Hong Kong Fir [1962] 2 Q.B. 26 and The Makedonia [1962] 1
Lloyd’s Rep. 316.
185 The Eurasian Dream supra note 169 at 744.
186 Ibid.
187 Hamburg rules-5(4)(a)
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measures that could reasonably be required to put out the fire and avoid or mitigate its
consequences’.
In applying this article, the carrier would be found liable under the Hamburg rules as
was found under the Hague/Hague Visby rules. The reasons for this conclusion are
that the carrier and crew failed to exercise due diligence and the carrier and crew were
therefore negligent and had failed to take reasonable measures to put out the fire.
4.8 Interpretation of the Hamburg rules
The application of the rules was based on the need to promote and consider
uniformity.188 The basis of liability set out in article 5(1) is unprecedented and its
interpretation seems to be left open to courts. The language is such that ‘it is a
language of compromise’.189 Establishing what the language means in terms of the
use of words such as ‘occurrence’190 and the term ‘all measures that could reasonably
be required’ is open to argument and possible conflicting decisions on the
interpretation and application of Article 5(1).191
188 D E Murray op cit note 27 at 59.
189 R  G Bauer op cit note 12 at 55.
190 F M Hannah op cit note 116 at 50.
191 R G Bauer op cit note 12 at 55. Also see the criticism of F M Hannah op cit note 116 at 50.
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4.9 Conclusion
Selvig states that the Hamburg rules have continued the ‘traditions of maritime law’ in
terms of the basis of liability, however, he asserts that they have also ‘moderately
increased the level of liability of carriers by sea’.192 This moderate increase in liability
can be seen in the fault based system provided for by the Hamburg rules. The
Hague/Hague-Visby rules provide for a proved fault based system whereas the
Hamburg rules provide for a presumed fault based system which places the burden of
discharging proof on the carrier from the start and according to Berlingieri, ‘the
Hamburg rules ignore the reversal of the burden of proof alternative except for the
loss, damage or delay caused by fire’.193 Furthermore the period of responsibility
provided for in the Hamburg rules is also a factor that increases the liability in its
extension of the period of responsibility under the Hague/Hague-Visby rules. One of
the most significant deviations from the Hague/Hague-Visby rules is the exclusion of
the nautical fault defence. The detractors of the Hamburg rules feel that the nautical
fault defence is an important ‘legal tool’, as it balances the risks between carrier and
cargo owner, while the proponents of the Hamburg rules feel that it is unfair on cargo
owners and is not in line with the law of other modes of transport. Nevertheless, an
analysis of the basis of liability Article 5(1) of the Hamburg rules, reveal that the
application of the article would probably have a similar outcome to the application of
the Hague/Hague-Visby rules. It is therefore submitted that Selvig is correct in stating
that there is only a moderate increase in liability since the outcomes of the application
will more often than not be  the same or similar.
It must be noted that several trading partners of South Africa have ratified the Hamburg
Rules and therefore its provisions must not be completely disregarded by South
Africa’s shipping community.194
192E Selvig op cit note 19 at 305.
193 F Berlingieri op cit note 25 at 9.
194 The International Comparative Legal Guide to: A practical cross-border insight into shipping law 3rd Edition
Shipping Law 2015, pg 191, http://www.wylie.co.za/wp-content/uploads/chapter-south-africa-international-
comparitive-legal-guide-to-shipping-law-2015-edition.pdf, accessed on 28 November 2018.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE BASIS OF LIABILITY AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF
UNDER THE ROTTERDAM RULES
5.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the Rotterdam rules, being the latest maritime regime and the
only multimodal regime. The chapter will discuss the aim of the new convention and
will cover aspects such as seaworthiness, the period of responsibility, and go further
to discuss the manner in which the Rotterdam rules operate in terms of the basis of
liability and the burden of proof. There will be a detailed discussion on the shifting of
the burden of proof and counter proof under article 17 as well as a critique of this
provision. The chapter will also discuss some of the defences under the Rotterdam
rules, including an in depth discussion of the abolition of the nautical fault rule.
5.2 Background of the Rotterdam Rules
The most widely applied international maritime regime to govern international carriage
by sea is the Hague/Hague-Visby rules. The Hamburg rules were then drafted in an
effort to ameliorate the balance between the shipper and the carrier in terms of their
respective interests, however, it did not achieve its purpose of gaining wide
acceptance.1
Moreover, international uniformity remained elusive. Some countries followed the
Hague/Hague-Visby rules, some followed the Hamburg rules and some countries went
the route of using ‘hybrid regimes’.2 With such a range of rules available it leads to a
division of the ‘international transport laws applicable to carriage of goods by sea’3
which results in legal uncertainty.
1 T Nikaki; B Soyer ‘New International Regime for Carriage of Goods by Sea: Contemporary, Certain, Inclusive
and Efficient, or Just Another One for the Shelves’ (2012) 30 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 303 at 304.
2 T Nikaki ‘The Carrier's Duties under the Rotterdam Rules: Better the Devil You Know’ (2010) 35 Tul.Mar. L.J. 1
at 2.
3T Nikaki op cit note 2 at 2. Also see M Katsivela ‘Overview of Ocean Carrier Liability Exceptions under the
Rotterdam Rules and the Hague-Hague/Visby Rules’ (2010) 40 Rev. Gen. 413 at 415.
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Accepting that the Hague/Hague-Visby rules were no longer in line with the
technological and commercial developments,4 and that the Hamburg rules had left
much to be desired, the CMI decided to embark on the preliminary work for a new
regime.5 The regime was then passed on to The United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (‘UNCITRAL’) and the draft of the convention was then
finalised.6 In December 2008, after 8 years of work,7 the General Assembly of the
United Nations adopted the new carriage convention, the United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (‘the
Rotterdam rules’).8
The Rotterdam rules aim at meeting the long evident need for ‘uniform rules to
modernise and harmonise rules that govern the international carriage of goods by a
sea’,9 but also go beyond any of the previous regimes and cover multimodal
transport.10
It is said that ‘the core of the convention is the carrier’s liability’11 set out in extensive
detail in chapter 5 of the rules. The carrier’s liability is primarily governed by article 17,
setting out the basis of the carrier’s liability, as well as the allocation of the burden of
proof.12
The Hague/Hague-Visby rules, the Hamburg rules and the Rotterdam rules are all fault
based systems. However, there is a difference in the structure of fault in the previous
regimes as compared to that of the Rotterdam rules.13 The Rotterdam rules were an
attempt to do away with the ‘shortcomings of the previous conventions and create a
new structure for the basis of the carriers liability’.14 The new regime provides for
4 T Nikaki op cit note 2 at 6. Also see M F Sturley, Chapter 2, General Principles of Transport Law and the
Rotterdam Rules at 78, available at http://www.newbooks
services.de/MediaFiles/Texts/2/9783642196492_Excerpt_001.pdf, accessed on 18 october 2018.
5 T Nikaki; B Soyer op cit note 1 at 304.
6 Ibid.
7 M F Sturley op cit note 4 at 64.
8 The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by
Sea(The Rotterdam rules) available at https://unctad.org/en/Docs/sdtetlb20042_en.pdf, accessed on 10
November 2018.
9 T Nikaki op cit note 2 at 6.
10 Ibid.
11 S Yuzhou; H H Li ‘The New Structure of the Basis of the Carrier's Liability under the Rotterdam Rules’
(2009)14 Unif. L. Rev. 931 at 931.
12 S Yuzhou; H H Li op cit note 11 at 931.
13Ibid.
14 S Yuzhou; H H Li op cit note 11 at 931.
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detailed rules on the allocation of the burden of proof.15 Furthermore, it is said that the
new regime is meant to enhance legal certainty, strengthen international trade and
provide more efficient rules that will be beneficial both domestically and
internationally.16 This change in law where there should be one regime to cover both
inland and sea legs of performance was first seen as being controversial.17 However,
it is said that the only way to achieve uniformity, certainty and predictability is for one
legal regime to govern the entire performance of the contract.18
In order for the convention to come into force there must be ratification or acceptance
by twenty countries.19 This has not yet taken place. In fact, only four countries have
ratified the convention.20 Ratification by several countries who play an important role
in international trade may persuade other countries to sign in order to continue trading
with some of its major trading partners.21 Countries such as the United States, France
and the Netherlands are all signatories to the Rotterdam rules and are key role players
‘of the global shipping market’,22 but they have not yet ratified the convention and may
never do so.
5.3 Seaworthiness
Article 14(a) of the Rotterdam rules provide that:
‘The carrier is bound before, at the beginning of, and during the voyage by sea to
exercise due diligence to make and keep the ship seaworthy’.23
15 S Yuzhou; H H Li op cit note 11 at 931.
16 S Hashmi ‘The Rotterdam Rules: A Blessing’ (2012) 10 Loy. Mar. L.J. at 227.
17 M F Sturley ‘Modernizing and Reforming U.S. Maritime Law: The Impact of the Rotterdam Rules in the
United States’ (2009) Texas International Law Journal, Vol 44:427 at 434.
18 M F Sturley op cit note 17 at 434.
19 J S Mo ‘Determination of Performing Party's Liability under the Rotterdam Rules’ (2010) 18 Asia Pac. L. Rev.
243 at 244.
20 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea
(New York, 2008)-Status, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/rotterdam_status.html, accessed on 10
November 2018.
21 M Katsivela op cit note 3 at 415.
22 J S Mo op cit note 19 at 257. The author places Netherlands and the United States in the top ten globally in
terms of fleets owned.
23 Rotterdam rules Article 14(a).
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A vessel is seaworthy under Article 14(a) if ‘she is fit to confront the ordinary perils that
are expected of the voyages and her engines are free of defects’.24
The duty to ensure seaworthiness under the Rotterdam rules is not an absolute duty;
it is one of due diligence as it is under the Hague/Hague-Visby rules.25
However, the carrier has a duty of seaworthiness throughout the voyage and not just
at the beginning of the voyage, unlike the Hague/Hague-Visby rules. This is a
substantial modification of the carrier’s responsibility.26 A possible issue may arise with
regards to the practicality of this obligation due to the fact that it may not be practical
to actually make the vessel seaworthy whilst the vessel is still out at sea and it may
only be reasonable to wait until the vessel is in the port.27 The reasonable ship-owner
test is the solution to the possible problem regarding this obligation as an objective
test will be done in order to establish what steps would be considered reasonable for
the carrier to have taken in light of the situation at hand.28 A contributing factor to
consider is whether the vessel was at sea or at a port of call when there was a need
for corrective measures.29
The continuing duty to provide a seaworthy ship to an extent ‘alters the overall risk
allocation between the carrier and cargo interests under the Rotterdam Rules’.30 The
reason for this is that a heavy burden will rest on the carrier which may ultimately result
in an increase of the freight rates.31
Defossez notes that the Hamburg rules had already introduced a continuous duty of
seaworthiness.32 However, according to Defossez, the duty should be ‘less onerous’
as it is not fair on the carriers to be accountable for the entire carriage.33 Conversely,
it can be argued that the continuing duty of the carrier under the Rotterdam rules is in
24 S Hashmi op cit note 16 at 245.
25 T Nikaki op cit note 2 at 14.
26 D A L Defossez ‘Seaworthiness: The Adequacy of the Rotterdam Rules Approach’ (2015) 28 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. at
244.
27 T Nikaki op cit note 2 at 14.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 D A L Defossez op cit note 26 at 244.
33 Ibid.
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line with the ‘current practice in this industry’34 and the reason for this is that there is
now a constant means of communication between the carrier and the vessel.35
The International Safety Management Code 36(hereinafter referred to as the ISM
Code) contains provisions in articles 637 and 1038 that are in line with article 4 of the
Rotterdam rules in terms of the period of responsibility of the carrier. Articles 6 and 10
of the ISM Code are ‘consistent’ with the Rotterdam rules in that their responsibilities
are similar.39 The continuing duty of the carrier found in the Rotterdam rules to ensure
seaworthiness throughout the voyage is much like that of the duty under the ISM
Code.40 The ISM Code makes provision for the obligation to ‘make and keep the vessel
seaworthy throughout the voyage’.41 This duty entails taking measures to ensure that
the vessel is seaworthy, for example, by conducting inspections at intervals and
reporting any issues with the vessel.42 In terms of article 10 of the ISM code, the duty
also extends throughout the voyage in that corrective measures must be taken if a
problem arises.43
34 D A L Defossez op cit note 26 at 244.
35 Ibid.
36 The International Safety Management Code-IMO Assembly Resolution A.741 (18) – 1993.
37 ISM Art 6 reads ‘…"6.1 The Company should ensure that the master is: properly qualified for command; fully
conversant with the company’s SMS; and given the necessary support so that the master’s duties can be safely
performed.
6.2 The Company should ensure that each ship is: .1 manned with qualified, certificated and medically fit
seafarers in accordance with national and international requirements; and .2 appropriately manned in order to
encompass all aspects of maintaining safe operations on board.
6.5 The Company should establish and maintain procedures for identifying any training which may be required
in support of the SMS and ensure that such training is provided for all personnel concerned.
6.7 The Company should ensure that the ship's personnel are able to communicate effectively in the execution
of their duties related to the SMS.
38 ISM Art 10 reads ‘…10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in
conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements
which may be established by the Company.
10.2 In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that: inspections are held at appropriate
intervals; any non-conformity is reported with its possible cause, if known; appropriate corrective action is
taken; and records of these activities are maintained. 10.3 The Company should establish procedures in SMS to
identify equipment and technical systems the sudden operational failure of which may result in hazardous
situations. The SMS should provide for specific measures aimed at promoting the reliability of such equipment
or systems. These measures should include the regular testing of stand-by arrangements and equipment or
technical systems that are not in continuous use.
10.4 The inspections mentioned in 10.2 as well as the measures referred to 10.3 should be integrated in the
ship's operational maintenance routine.
39 D A L Defossez op cit note 26 at 245.
40 Ibid.
41 T Nikaki op cit note 2 at 11.
42 T Nikaki op cit note 2 at 11.
43 D A L Defossez op cit note 26 at 245.
86
5.4 Period of responsibility
Article 12 rule 1 of the Rotterdam rules makes provision for the period of responsibility
of the carrier. It states that:
‘The period of responsibility of the carrier for the goods under this Convention begins
when the carrier or a performing party receives the goods for carriage and ends when
the goods are delivered.’44
Article 12 of the Rotterdam rules go further than the previous conventions and extends
the period of responsibility.45 This extension is referred to as a ‘door to door’ period of
liability. This ‘door to door’ period includes responsibility for the goods at the port and
not only on board the vessel ‘subject to loading, storage, relocation, and unloading.’46
There is a significant increase in the period of responsibility when compared to the
Hague/Hague-Visby rules ‘tackle to tackle’ period of responsibility47 and the Hamburg
rules ‘port to port’ period of responsibility.48
The period of responsibility under the Rotterdam rules is different from the previous
conventions in that it makes provision for multimodal carriage of goods; however, there
must be a sea leg to the carriage of goods in order to make use of multimodal
carriage.49 In terms of the periods before loading or after discharge, the parties may
use their discretion and agree on any other rules ‘subject to any other mandatory
national law that may apply’.50
However, it seems that article 12 creates uncertainty in a situation of multiple carriers
as to whether the multimodal carrier or the inland carrier will be liable for damage on
loading or discharge.51 There are instances where both of these carriers are used. It
44 Rotterdam rules-Article 12(1).
45 M Katsivela op cit note 3 at 418
46 D M Bovio ‘Ocean Carriers' Duty of Care to Cargo in Port: The Rotterdam Rules of 2009’ (2009) 32 Fordham
Int'l L.J. 1162 at 1168.
47 S Hashmi op cit note 16 at 245.
48 M F Sturley op cit note 17 at 434.
49 M Katsivela op cit note 3 at 418.
50 M F Sturley op cit note 17 at 434.
51 J M Alcantara…et al ‘Particular Concerns with Regard to the Rotterdam Rules’ (2010) 2 Cuadernos Derecho
Transnacional 5 at 7.
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is submitted that the liability would fall on the multimodal carrier and not the inland
carrier if there is a problem that arises.52
Furthermore, another issue with the ‘door to door’ period of responsibility contained in
the Rotterdam rules, is that it ‘fails to achieve its object of unifying the carriage of goods
by sea’ as the rules on liability are not in keeping with other conventions.53
5.5 Basis of liability and burden of proof under the Rotterdam rules
Alcantara criticises article 17 for ‘excessive and unnecessary complexity’.54 In terms
of the burden of proof it is said to fall on whichever party has the ‘ability to prove the
issue in question’.55 According to Yuzhou and Li, there are two rounds of proof and
counter proof that make up the basis of liability and the burden of proof, and this
includes three presumptions of the carrier’s fault.56
5.5.1 First Round of Proof and Counter-Proof57
Article 17(1) of the Rotterdam rules states that:58
‘The carrier is liable for loss of or damage to the goods, as well as for delay in delivery,
if the claimant proves that the loss, damage, or delay, or the event or circumstance
that caused or contributed to it took place during the period of the carrier’s
responsibility as defined in chapter 4’
The abovementioned article clearly outlines the initial burden of proof and provides
that this initial burden of proof will rest on the claimant. When the claimant discharges
his burden of proof, the carrier is presumed to be at fault.59 This is where the counter
proof comes in, as the carrier will be able to rebut the presumption of fault, by making
use of either article 17(2) or (3) of the convention.60
Article 17(2) states that:
52 J M Alcantara…et al op cit note 51 at 7.
53 S Hashmi op cit note 16 at 235.
54 J M Alcantara…et al op cit note 51 at 7.
55 Ibid.
56 S Yuzhou; H H Li op cit note 11 at 932.
57 Ibid.
58 Rotterdam rules, Article 17(1)-Basis of Liability.
59 S Yuzhou; H H Li op cit note 11 at 932.
60 Ibid.
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‘The carrier is relieved of all or part of its liability pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article
if it proves that the cause or one of the causes of the loss, damage, or delay is not
attributable to its fault or to the fault of any person referred to in article 18.’61
Article 17(3) provides that:
‘The carrier is also relieved of all or part of its liability pursuant to paragraph 1 of this
article if, alternatively to proving the absence of fault as provided in paragraph 2 of this
article, it proves that one or more of the following events or circumstances caused or
contributed to the loss, damage, or delay:
(a) ‘Act of God;
(b) Perils, dangers, and accidents of the sea or other navigable waters;
(c) War, hostilities, armed conflict, piracy, terrorism, riots, and civil commotions;
(d) Quarantine restrictions; interference by or impediments created by
governments, public authorities, rulers, or people including detention, arrest, or
seizure not attributable to the carrier or any person referred to in article 18;
(e) Strikes, lockouts, stoppages, or restraints of labour;
(f) Fire on the ship;
(g) Latent defects not discoverable by due diligence;
(h) Act or omission of the shipper, the documentary shipper, the controlling party,
or any other person for whose acts the shipper or the documentary shipper is
liable pursuant to article 33 or 34;
(i) Loading, handling, stowing, or unloading of the goods performed pursuant to
an agreement in accordance with article 13, paragraph 2, unless the carrier or
a performing party performs such activity on behalf of the shipper, the
documentary shipper or the consignee;
(j) Wastage in bulk or weight or any other loss or damage arising from inherent
defect, quality, or vice of the goods;
61 Rotterdam rules, Article 17(2)-Basis of Liability.
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(k) Insufficiency or defective condition of packing or marking not performed by or
on behalf of the carrier;
(l) Saving or attempting to save life at sea;
(m) Reasonable measures to save or attempt to save property at sea;
(n) Reasonable measures to avoid or attempt to avoid damage to the environment;
or
(o) Acts of the carrier in pursuance of the powers conferred by articles 15 and 16.’62
If the carrier fails to prove one of the above alternatives, the carrier will be liable. If the
carrier proves the first alternative then that proof will be sufficient.   In situations where
the carrier is partly to blame, further proof may be necessary to fully relieve the carrier.
If the cause or causes of the loss were in no way attributable to its fault there will be
no need for any ‘counter proof’ by the claimant.63 In a situation where the carrier elects
to prove the second alternative, being the existence of an excepted peril which caused
or contributed to the loss, damage or delay, a second round of further proof by the
claimant is required.64
5.5.2 Second Round of Proof and Counter-Proof65
When it is proved that one of the excepted perils under article 17(3) apply the claimant
will then need to establish further proof.
As stated in article 17(4):
‘Notwithstanding paragraph 3 of this article, the carrier is liable for all or part of the
loss, damage, or delay:
(a) If the claimant proves that the fault of the carrier or of a person referred to in article
18 caused or contributed to the event or circumstance on which the carrier relies;
or
(b) If the claimant proves that an event or circumstance not listed in paragraph 3 of
this article contributed to the loss, damage, or delay, and the carrier cannot prove
62 Rotterdam rules, Article 17(3).
63 S Yuzhou; H H Li op cit note 11 at 932.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid at 933.
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that this event or circumstance is not attributable to its fault or to the fault of any
person referred to in article 18.’66
As stated in article 17(5):
‘The carrier is also liable, notwithstanding paragraph 3 of this article, for all or part of
the loss, damage, or delay if:
(a) ‘The claimant proves that the loss, damage, or delay was or was probably caused
by or contributed to by
(i) the unseaworthiness of the ship;
(ii) the improper crewing, equipping, and supplying of the ship; or
(iii) the fact that the holds or other parts of the ship in which the goods are carried, or
any containers supplied by the carrier in or upon which the goods are carried, were not
fit and safe for reception, carriage, and preservation of the goods; and
(b) The carrier is unable to prove either that:
(i) none of the events or circumstances referred to in subparagraph 5 (a) of this article
caused the loss, damage, or delay; or
(ii) it complied with its obligation to exercise due diligence pursuant to article 14.’
If it is proved by the claimant that the fault of the carrier caused an excepted peril in
terms of Art 17(4)(a) then the carrier will no longer be able to show counter proof and
will be held liable.67 However, if an unlisted peril contributed to the loss, which the
claimant must prove under article 17(4)(b), the carrier must show counter proof that
the peril was not attributable to its fault. In the event of the carrier not being able to do
so, there will be a presumption of liability which Yuzhou and Li refer to as the second
presumption under article 17.68
With regards to article 17(5), if the claimant elects to prove the unseaworthiness of the
vessel69 and successfully discharges this burden of proof, the carrier will be presumed
liable with an option of providing counter proof in this respect.70 The wording of article
66 Rotterdam rules-Article 17(4)
67 S Yuzhou; H H Li op cit note 11 at 934
68 Ibid.
69 Which could also entail improper manning or uncargoworthiness of the vessel i.e. one or more of the
circumstances outlined in article 17(5)(a)(i)-(iii).
70 S Yuzhou; H H Li op cit note 11 at 934
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17(5)(a) refers to ‘probably caused or contributed to’, which may have to be interpreted
as prima facie proof, even if open to some doubt.71 If the carrier is unable to
successfully discharge the burden of proof, he will not be able to rebut the presumption
of liability and will therefore be held liable.72 This is the third presumption of liability in
article 17 which will be sustained if not proven otherwise.73 In terms of article 17(5)(b)
the carrier can rebut the presumption by proving that the unseaworthiness did not
cause the loss, damage or delay.74 To distinguish this from article 17(5)(a) this may
have to be understood as conclusive proof, being, proof on a balance of probabilities.75
The carrier can also rebut the presumption by proving that it complied with the
obligation to exercise due diligence.76
5.5.3 Concurrent causes of loss
Article 17(6) states that:
‘When the carrier is relieved of part of its liability pursuant to this article, the carrier is
liable only for that part of the loss, damage or delay that is attributable to the event or
circumstance for which it is liable pursuant to this article.’
During the drafting of article 17(6), the working group considered the position on the
Vallescura rule.77 In the Schnell v Vallescura78 case, which was discussed in chapter
three, the U.S. Supreme Court held that ‘the carrier is liable for the whole of the loss
or damage unless he proves the portion of the loss or damage which is attributable to
the excepted peril.’79
71 S Yuzhou; H H Li op cit note 11 at 934.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 F Berlingieri ‘A Comparative Analysis of The Hague-Visby Rules, The Hamburg Rules and The Rotterdam
rules’ 2009 at 9 available at
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/workinggroups/wg_3/Berlingieri_paper_comparing_RR_Hamb_HVR.pdf,
accessed on 21 July 2018.
75 Ibid at 9.
76 M Katsivela op cit note 3 at 425. See also J M Alacantara op cit note 51 at 7.
77 S Yuzhou; H H Li op cit note 11 at 939.
78 Schnell v The Vallescura 293 U.S.296 (1934).
79 Ibid.
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The Rotterdam Rules take a different approach and does not state how exactly the
burden of proof works in terms of the carrier proving the extent to which he is liable
and the extent to which he is not liable for contributing to the loss, damage or delay.80
In cases dealing with concurrent causes of loss under the Rotterdam rules it will
probably be left to the national courts of each country to make a decision as to
liability.81
5.5.4 Critique of Article 17
Proponents of the Rotterdam rules argue that it ‘marks clear progress’ 82 as it states
exactly which party has the burden of proof in relation to any particular issue or event.
They argue that the previous conventions did not make it clear when the burden of
proof rested on the claimant.83 However, while it has resolved some of the previous
‘complexities’ found in the regimes that preceded it, it may also result in ‘ambiguity’
where there are concurrent causes of loss.84 Article 17.2-5 does not provide any clarity
in the ‘allocation of liability’ in concurrent causes of loss.85
The article is not only complicated but also fails to make provision for other modes of
transport. The Rotterdam rules is a multimodal regime yet it fails to provide exceptions
under article 17 for any mode other than maritime.86 In terms of the burden of proof,
article 17(5)(a) makes provision for what the cargo owner must prove in order for the
carrier to be held liable, however, it will be difficult for the cargo owner to discharge its
burden of proof without the full cooperation of the carrier.87 Furthermore, if the cargo
owner discharges this burden of proof the carrier will be allowed the option to counter
prove which suggests that the due diligence of the carrier has decreased.88 In terms
of article 17(6), there is no clarity on the apportionment of liability when a carrier is
80 F Berlingieri, An analysis of two recent commentaries of the Rotterdam Rules, available at
https://comitemaritime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/An-analysis-of-two-recent-commentaries-of-the-
RR-F.Berlingieri.pdf, accessed on 25 October 2018.
81 F Berlingieri op cit note 80.
82 S Yuzhou; H H Li op cit note 11 at 934.
83 Ibid.
84 T Nikaki; B Soyer op cit note at 318.
85 Ibid.
86 J M Alcantara…et al op cit note 51 at 7.
87 Ibid.
88 J M Alcantara…et al op cit note 51 at 7.
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only partially liable and the rules fail to make provision for the burden of proof in this
respect.89 Nikaki and Soyer are of the view that the ‘ambiguities’ in the Rotterdam rules
are not merely in respect of a technical nature but rather ‘ambiguities’ that pertain to
the ‘central provisions of liability’.90
5.6. Removal of the nautical fault rule under the Rotterdam rules
The removal of the nautical fault rule under the Rotterdam rules is still viewed as a
‘drastic change for the carriers’,91 although foreshadowed by the Hamburg rules.92
Hashimi discusses the impact of this change in an analysis of the decision in
Compania Sud Americana de Vapores SA v Sinochem Tianjin Import & Export Corp
(The Aconcagua),93 which was decided under the Hague rules. In this case a container
of calcium hypochlorite exploded due to it having been negligently stowed next to a
fuel tank, which was then heated during the voyage.94 The carrier admitted that it had
been negligent in stowing the container; failing to handle the cargo properly and
carefully under article 3 rule 2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. However, it argued
that ‘the heating of the bunker fuel was an act, neglect or default in the management
of the vessel’ and that it could therefore rely on article 4 rule 2(a) to escape liability.95
The court upheld this argument, finding that the negligent decision of the chief officer
to heat a cargo of calcium hypochlorite adjacent to the bunker tank, fell within the
neglect and default of management exception provided for under article 4 rule 2(a).96
If the Rotterdam rules were applied there would have been a different outcome as the
nautical fault exception is removed.97 Therefore, the carrier would not have been able
to escape liability even if the liability was due to a default in the management of the
89 T Nikaki; B Soyer op cit note 1 at 318.
90 Ibid at 319.
91 S Hashmi op cit note 16 at 247.
92 M F Sturley op cit note 4 at 78.
93 CSAV v. Sinochem Tianjin Limited [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep., affd. [2011] 1 Lloyd’s rep. 683.
94Ibid para. 359-379, affd. [2011] 1 Lloyd’s rep. 683. Also see R Aikens… et al Bills of Lading 2 ed (2016) at 323
para 10.118 and S Hashmi op cit note 16 at 247.
95 CSAV supra note 93 at 53 para 372.
96 Ibid at 683.
97 S Hashmi op cit note 16 at 247.
94
vessel.98 The analysis of this case emphasises the negative impact that the possible
removal of the nautical fault rule will have on the carriers.
Yuzhou and Hai Li on the other hand, after a survey of the discussions in the working
groups that led to the convention, indicate that the removal of this rule would be a
development for international maritime legislation adequate to the demands of the
present time, and was favoured by most delegates.99 There is a misconception that
there is a need for the nautical fault rule due to the inability of the carrier to control the
vessel, however, ‘contemporary satellite technologies, for instance, enable continuous
monitoring and control of ship operations (including the actions of the ship’s crew)
through, inter alia, radar and GPS.’100 Thus, technology has solved the problem that
was the reason for the drafting of the nautical fault rule, and therefore there is no longer
a need for the rule.101 Yuzhou and Hai Li  are also of the view that the removal of the
rule is the only way to open the way for multimodal ‘door to door’ carriage as the
nautical fault rule is not in line with laws other than maritime laws.102
5.7 Exceptions of Fire, Perils of the Sea and Inherent Vice
Article 17 rule (3)(f) makes provision for the defence of fire on a ship.103 According to
Thomas, the ‘main concern of the working party in relation to the Hague rules fire
exception was the incidence of the burden of proof’.104 They believed that the burden
of proof on the claimant provided for by the fire exception under the Hague/Hague-
Visby rules was ‘excessive’, furthermore that in most cases it would be ‘impossible’ to
prove that the fire was caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier.105
98 S Hashmi op cit note 16 at 247.
99 S Yuzhou; H H Li op cit note 11 at 937.
100 P Leau ‘Dead in the Water: The Nautical Fault Exemption of the Hague-Visby Rules’ (2015/2016) Juris, Vol 7
available at http://www.singaporelawreview.com/juris-
illuminaeentries/2016/wqfuuhr7jl0obc8ig1klfe8exka0ea, accessed on 25/10/2018.
101 P Leau op cit note 100.
102 S Yuzhou; H H Li op cit note 11 at 938.
103 Rotterdam rules-Article 17(3)(f).
104 D R Thomas The Carriage of Goods by Sea Under the Rotterdam Rules Lloyd’s List London (2010) at 148 para
8.23.
105 Ibid at 148 para 8.23.
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The retention of the Hague/Hague-Visby rules fire exception gained support from
some, while others sought that the exception be removed from the rules.106 ‘The brief
wording appearing in the Rotterdam rules is the result of a compromise’.107 The
Rotterdam rules provide that the cargo claimant must either prove the fault of the
carrier or he may prove the fault of any other person ‘involved in the performance of
the contract of carriage, or the vessel’s unseaworthiness.’108 In Canada, a comparison
of the Hague/Hague-Visby and the Rotterdam rules show that the Rotterdam rules
afford the carriers less protection as compared to the Hague/Hague-Visby rules.109
The Hague/Hague-Visby rules require the cargo claimant to prove actual fault or privity
of the carrier whereas the Rotterdam rules do not have the same requirement.110
Article 17(3)(b) provides for the perils of the sea exception under the Rotterdam rules
and the ‘format’ of this provision mirrors the exception under the Hague/Hague-Visby
rules.111 Thomas mentions that the working group took the view that the Hague-
Hague-Visby rules had to be ‘followed closely’ if ‘certainty and predictability’ was to be
maintained.112 In practice however, there will be a change in terms of the shifting of
the burden of proof as provided earlier on in this chapter.
Article 17(3) makes provision for inherent vice as stated earlier on in this chapter. This
provision is said to be unchanged and therefore the Hague/Hague-Visby case law
would be applicable to the provision under the Rotterdam rules.113
5.8 Interpretation of the Rotterdam rules
Article 2 of the Rotterdam rules expresses the ideal of international uniformity in the
interpretation and application of the rules as follows:
‘In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international
106 D R Thomas op cit note 104 at 149 para 8.24.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid at 149 para 8.25, See also M Katsivela op cit note 3 at 445.
109 M Katsivela op cit note 3 at 445.
110 Ibid at 446.
111 D R Thomas op cit note 104 at 149 para 8.27.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid at 155 para 8.41.
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character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the
observance of good faith in international trade.’
Nikaki argues that because the rules are an ‘update’ of the familiar basis of liability of
the Hague/Hague-Visby rules, ‘extensive’ case law decided under the Hague/Hague-
Visby rules will assist in the interpretation of the Rotterdam rules, and largely avert any
major issues that may have to be litigated on.114 That will, however, only be possible
if there is uniformity in interpreting article 3(1) and 3(2) of the Hague/Hague-Visby
rules, and where the rules cover similar issues.115 However, where there are already
divergent approaches under the Hague/Hague-Visby rules, such as to the
interpretation of the duty of care under article 3, or where the Rotterdam rules go
beyond the Hague/Hague-Visby rules, there is a need for courts to develop a uniform
interpretation of ‘key concepts’ within the Rotterdam rules.116 On Nikaki’s analysis the
courts in different jurisdictions take a uniform approach in looking at seaworthiness
and due diligence as well having agreed that there is an objective reasonable ship-
owner in place to determine whether or not the carrier acted accordingly.117
However, the duty to care for the cargo under the Rotterdam rules still presents an
issue of uncertainty. The duty to ‘properly and carefully’ carry out the duties under
article 3 rule 2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby rules, is the same as the duty under the
Rotterdam rules.118 It is agreed by the courts around the world that the term ‘properly’
means ‘a sound system’, however, in as much as there is agreement on the definition
of the term ‘properly’, there is no uniformity in the approach of the standard of care of
the carrier.119 The difference in approach can be seen in the approach of Canada and
the United States as follows:120
‘Some courts in Canada have ruled that the obligation to care for the goods is stringent,
being qualified by the words "properly and carefully," and not that of "due diligence,"
as "due diligence" only appears in the Hague and the Hague-Visby Rules at article 3.1
(due diligence to make the ship seaworthy), and article 4.2(p) (latent defects not
discoverable by due diligence).  At the other end of the range, the courts in the United
114 T Nikaki op cit note 2 at 16.
115 Ibid at 16 and 18. Also see S Yuzhou; H H Li op cit note 11 at 938.
116 T Nikaki op cit note 2 at 24, referring to, in particular, the term ‘during the voyage’.
117 Ibid at 19.
118 Ibid at 22.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid at 23.
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States have construed article 3.2 as requiring the carrier to only exercise due diligence
as regards the cargo.’
The divergent interpretations on the appropriate standard of care under article 3 rule2
of the Hague and the Hague-Visby Rules may be seen as a potential threat to the
uniform application of article 13 of the Rotterdam Rules, which will not only jeopardise
the intended harmonisation of the international carriage of goods by sea laws, but will
also encourage ‘forum shopping’ practices.121
5.9 Conclusion
Some argue that, the current shipping industry as it stands today requires the adoption
of a regime such as the Rotterdam rules and that its universal adoption is therefore
inevitable.122 There may be deficiencies within the Rotterdam rules that are not
foreseeable but that will only come to light once the Rotterdam rules are being
applied.123 However, the deficiencies within the Rotterdam rules noted by detractors
are not such that the rules will not be able to operate efficiently.124 Perhaps the greatest
danger lies in Rotterdam rules coming into force and only receiving minimum support
from states. If so, then it will have a similar effect to the receipt of the Hamburg rules,
leading only to ‘further fragmentation of the carriage of goods by sea laws.’125 It is
argued that an alternative to ratifying the Rotterdam rules would be to apply the
Hague/Hague Visby rules and address their shortcomings by excluding certain
provisions, such as the nautical fault rule and including other beneficial provisions from
the Rotterdam rules, such as provisions for electronic documents.126 South Africa
could consider implementing such a suggestion through an amendment to COGSA.
However, for nations to do so would greatly increase the fragmentation of laws and in
South Africa’s case would put it out of step with its Hague/Hague-Visby international
trade partners.
121 T Nikaki op cit note at 24.
122 J S Mo op cit note 19 at 257.
123 D M Bovio op cit note 46 at 1204. Also see J S Mo op cit note 19 at 257.
124 J S Mo op cit note 19 at 257.
125 Theodora Nikaki op cit note 2 at 45.
126 J M Alcantara…et al op cit note 51 at 14.
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Ultimately on the question of the burden of proof, the proof outlined in the Rotterdam
rules is detailed in terms of the burden of proof and order of proof. This means that
there is progress in terms of the provisions for the burden of proof as the Rotterdam
rules have outlined the burden of proof in comprehensively, whereas the previous
regimes have not adequately done so. The Hague/Hague-Visby rules and the
Hamburg rules fail to make provision for which burden of proof will rest on the claimant.
Article 17 has been drafted in such a way that both the cargo owner and the carrier
will at all times know where they stand in terms of the burden of proof or the counter
of proof. This is clearly a step in the right direction. However, article 17 is too long and
complicated which may prove to be problematic in its entirety when applied.
One of the main objectives of the Rotterdam rules is to create uniformity. However, it
seems that instead of reaching its objective of uniformity it may do the opposite127 and
bring about more uncertainty and confusion.
127 J M Alcantara…et al op cit note 51 at 15.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the various international regimes in
the carriage of goods by sea, to establish how each regime makes provision for and
deals with the basis of the carrier’s liability and the burden of proof. Furthermore, to
compare and contrast the operation of the regimes, namely; the Hague/Hague-Visby
Rules, the Hamburg Rules and the Rotterdam Rules. Depending on the
circumstances, it is clear that the burden of proof may be of great significance to the
outcome of a case. Establishing which party the burden of proof lies on has proven to
be a difficult task in matters where an incident takes place at sea and the claimant
would then have difficulty discharging the burden of proof. As stated by Force, this
difficulty may arise when it is unclear how the damage or loss occurred or where there
is an unresolvable conflict of evidence.1
6.1 Summary of findings
In chapter two, the Hague and Hague-Visby rules were considered and the findings
were that the Hague/Hague-Visby rules have successfully been applied for decades.
The rules however, do not make provision for modern international trade in terms of
the multimodal transportation of goods and this suggests a lack of progression in
international trade in terms of modern practices in the shipping industry. The
Hague/Hague-Visby rules have attempted to balance the allocation of risks between
the cargo owner and carrier by placing the risk of ensuring the seaworthiness of the
vessel on the carrier and the cargo owner’s risk is the carrier’s use of the errors in
navigation and management defence.
Chapter three then examined the burden of proof under the Hague and Hague-Visby
rules in more detail. It contrasted the traditional approach advocated by professor
Tetley and supported in some case law with the approach adopted in the United
Kingdom in the Volcafe case and in Australia in the case of the Bunga Seroja. It is
submitted that the approach adopted in Volcafe is correct and therefore that the
burden of proof in the Hague/Hague-Visby rules rests on the claimant, which is in line
1 R Force ‘A Comparison of the Hague, Hague Visby, and Hamburg rules: Much ado about (?)’ (1995-1996) 70
Tulane Law Review at 2085.
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with the maxim that he who alleges must prove. It is insufficient for a claimant to
therefore rely solely on proof that the goods were loaded in good order and condition
and discharged damaged. In certain circumstances that may be sufficient for the court
to draw an inference that the goods were damaged during the period of the carrier’s
responsibility and that may set up a prima facie case which, if the carrier does not offer
any evidence to rebut, could become conclusive proof. However, the claimant bears
the overall onus of proof throughout the case and must therefore put forward whatever
proof they have to show that the carrier has failed to take proper care of the cargo. In
other words to establish the carrier’s negligence or that the vessel was unseaworthy,
and that this caused the loss or damage. In the latter instance the onus would shift to
the carrier to prove that he had exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy.
Understood in this way, the shift is a shift of an evidentiary burden to the carrier to
discharge a prima facie case set up by the claimant but is not a shift of the burden of
proof and this is in line with the view accepted by academics that the Hague-Visby
rules is a proved fault system.
Chapter 4 considered the Hamburg rules. It is more difficult to assess the extent to
which the Hamburg rules will have an effect in practice on the outcome of cargo claims
as each case will be determined by its own facts. Force argues that although the
Hamburg rules do mark a change from the proved fault system to a presumed fault
system, in many cases this will not affect the outcome of the cargo claim. He argues
that it is only ‘factually sensitive’ cases that the burden of proof will have a decisive
impact, that is in cases where it is unclear what caused the damage to the cargo or
cases where there is contradictory evidence on what caused the damage to the cargo.
In both those cases the party with the burden of proof would be unable to discharge
the burden on a balance of probabilities. It is therefore significant in those cases to
determine whether the burden is in fact on the carrier as provided in article 5(1) of
Hamburg rather than on the claimants as provided under Hague/Hague-Visby.
Chapter 5 examined the Rotterdam rules and the changes made in this latest regime.
One such change is that the Rotterdam rules do set out in some detail the shifting
burden of proof and the order of proof, however, this has been criticised as being too
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complicated2 as well as ambiguous3 in the case of concurrent causes of loss. Although
the Rotterdam rules sets out the burden of proof expressly, it could be more practical
and easier for judges if there were fewer clear and concise principles. The objective
of the Rotterdam rules is to reach uniformity in international maritime trade, however
if it comes into force and does not gain adequate support it is clear that it will have the
same effect as that of the Hamburg rules and further fragment maritime laws.
6.2 Recommendations
As stated above, the purpose of this dissertation was to compare the burden of proof
provided for in the international maritime regimes. Currently, the Hague/Hague-Visby
rules are incorporated into South African law by virtue of COGSA. The question then
arises as to whether or not we should retain the Hague/Hague-Visby rules. One of the
reasons for its retention would be that most of the international maritime community
still subscribes to the Hague/Hague-Visby rules and it would therefore be safer in the
interests of uniformity that we continue to apply the Hague/Hague-Visby rules.
According to Alcantara4, we presently have a system of liability that works well and
that is not complicated. Thus, the way forward could be to amend the COGSA by
simply removing the nautical fault defence, on the basis that there is no longer a need
for this defence in modern maritime trade. This is an approach that South Africa should
endorse and it is not appropriate for us to consider adopting the Hamburg rules or the
Rotterdam rules, at least not until it becomes clear that either of them have received
significant support from a large number of trading nations.
The analysis of the basis of liability and the burden of proof in the various maritime
regimes has brought the writer to the conclusion that based on the above findings,
South Africa should retain the widely accepted Hague/Hague-Visby rules.
2 J M Alcantara…et al ‘Particular Concerns with Regard to the Rotterdam Rules’ (2010) 2 Cuadernos Derecho
Transnacional 5 at 7.
3 T Nikaki and B Soyer ‘A new international regime for carriage of goods by sea: Contemporary, certain,
inclusive and efficient, or just another one for the shelves?’ (2012) 30 (2) Berkeley Journal of International Law
at 318.
4 J M Alcantara…et al op cit note 2 at 14.
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